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PREFACE 
Whi l e often overshadowed by faculty research, the efforts 
of students should not be overlooked, and this journal hopefully 
will encourage scholarly research by students and provide a means 
by which their efforts will be recognized. Phi Alpha Theta is 
greatly indebted to the History Department of Western Kentucky 
University headed by Dr. Richard Troutman. We are grateful to 
our Consulting Editors, Dr. Charles Bussey , Dr. Carol Crowe Carraco, 
and Dr. David Lee, for their assistance in this project . A special 
thanks goes to Mr. A. T . Stephens for designing our cover. For 
her tireless and exacting effort Phi Alpha Theta thanks our typist, 
Mrs. Jane Wilson . Our most profound debt of gratitude goes to the 
contributing writers--those who were published and those who were 
not- -that constitute a group which forms the heart of any publica-
tion. 
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HENRY WIRZ : 
THE LAST VICTH1 OF ANDERSONVILLE 
The war was over, but four years of mounting hatred could 
not be swept away with the defeat of the Confederacy. Living 
skeletons had made their way to the Nor th as proof of the horrible 
treatment Union prisoners had suffered at the h a nds of their Rebel 
captors. Stories had begun spreading months before the "Tar's end, 
but as the subject of prisoners of war developed into a raging 
controversy, Andersonville became the symbol of all the misery and 
suffering. Someone was to blame for the atrocities; someone would 
pay! In 1865 when Northern, vindictive eyes were directed to the 
Andersonville commandant, Henry Wirz became the most hated man in 
America. Was he Satan incarnate, or was he the Andersonville 
scapegoat--a minor figure in American history who was used by the 
powerful and condemned by the p ublic and the press before his trial 
began? 
The facts of his early life are few and enigmatic. Heinrich 
Hartman Wirz was born in Zurich, Switzerland, on November 25, 1 822 
or 1823. There are conflicting reports concerning his professional 
training and career. He may have spent some of his time working 
with his father as a tailor; others suggest that he spent nine 
years in the European military, while some say that he held medi-
cal degrees from the Universities of Paris and Berlin and that he 
was a practicing medical doctor, not a surgeon. l Ovid Futch con-
cludes that he had no medical credentials; rather, that he was a 
bath attendant during the time when respected medical men used bath 
treatments. He adds that it is very unlike ly that if he had had 
medical training, the Confederacy would have failed to assign him 
to the medical service. 2 
In 1845 Wirz married Emilie Oschwald. They became the parents 
of one daughter and one son. Four years later he immigrated to 
the United States without his family. Whether his wife had died, 
or whether the marriage had ended in divorce, is not evident. 3 
Some, accusing him of having money problems wh ich led to trouble 
with the law, claim that he likely was banished by the Swiss 
government after serving a term for forgery and embezzlement. 4 
He arrived in America in 1849, a trained physician according 
to some, an imposter according to others. He first worked as a 
weaver in a Nassachusetts factory and later became an assistant 
to a doctor in Hopkinsville, Kentucky. He soon moved to Louisville, 
where he began working for Dr. Edward Caspari. After a short while, 
he moved to Cadiz, Kentucky, and began practicing medicine on his 
Denise Ruth Walker 
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own . There he married !1rs . Elizabeth Wolf , a widow with two chil-
dren . The next year Cora , his last child, was born. Wirz and his 
nel, family moved to l"li l liken ' s Bend , Louisiana , where he established 
a medical practice. S 
James Page and Darrett Rutman have written that at the out-
break of the war he had a l arge and profitabl e medical practice , 
whi l e Futch says he possibly served as the doctor for the s l aves 
on the Marshall planta t ion . Futch , apparently influenced by nega-
tive accounts , interpre t s Hirz ' s various moves as further evidence 
of fraudulent attempts to practice medicine . 6 
On June 16 , 1861 , Wirz enlisted as a private in the Fourth 
Louisiana Infantry . He rose rapid l y in the Confederate army , earn-
ing the rank of sergeant within a year . 7 During the Battle of 
Seven Pines he received an incurable wound in his right arm . Eleven 
days later he was promoted to captain for gallantry on the battle-
fie l d . Unfit for duty at the front , he was assigned to command the 
Union prisoners at Tuscaloosa , Alabama , under the direction of 
General John Winder . With his health soon failing him , Wirz applied 
for a fur l ough , and on December 19 , 1862 , he sailed for Europe as 
a Confederate emissary to Paris and Berlin . He remained in Europe 
for over a year , until February , 1864 . In Paris unsuccessful sur-
gery was performed on his right arm . The wound was to remain a 
source of nagging pain for the rest of his life. After his return , 
he was assigned to command the prison interior at Andersonvi l le , 
(!larch 27 , 1864) where he was to have control over discipline and 
facilities. 8 The command wou l d make him infamous , for the names 
Wirz and Andersonville were destined to become synonymous with the 
"Devil " and "Hell. 11 
Andersonville , located in southwestern Georgia and far from 
the seat of war , had been selected as a prison site when it became 
necessary to remove the prisoners from Richmond . In December, 1863 , 
Captain Richard B. l'iinder was ordered to oversee the construction 
of a stockade and to make ready for 1 0 , 000 prisoners. 9 Camp 
Sumter at Andersonvi l le was to be the "grand receptacle" for en-
listed men captured throughout the South; 1 0 officers Ivere to be 
kept at Macon . ll 
From the very beginning the officials in charge were confronted 
with unalterable situations . Before preparations were complete , 
officials were informed that prisoners would be arriving dai l y . 
In the middle of February , 1864 , the first group arrived at the 
unfinished stockade . 1 2 Hesseltine writes that "The officers in 
charge of the prison coul d do little more than to secure the 
prisoners "13 
~Ihen Hirz arrived in April , he found prison conditions bad, 
and in spite of the efforts he and others made, conditions grew 
lvorse . The horrors of Andersonville have echoed throughout the 
pages of h istory . Within four months , the sixteen and one- half 
acre stockade was enlarged by ten acres , but overcrowding was 
only temporarily relieved as prisoners continued to arrive daily 
by the trainload. 14 
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Unbelievable discomfort was caused by lack of shelter as the 
prisoners were exposed to rain, heat and cold. There were no 
barracks or tents, not even trees to offer protection since they 
had been used in the construction of the stockade. Improvised 
shelters sprang up in a haphazard manner as prisoners covered the 
severed tree branches and poles with old blankets, dirt or any thing 
else that might afford the slightest protection. IS Exposure was 
more intense as their clothes rotted away and their captors could 
furnish them none. The desperate prisoners frequently resorted to 
fighting over the clothing of their dying comrades before their 
bodies were taken to the dead house where the awaited burial was 
simply a cover of earth and a numbered grave marker. 16 
The only necessity provided for the prisoners was food--this 
of poor quality and meager amounts. From the beginning, the 
Commissary General had insufficient funds for rations; and during 
the final months, he received no government money at all . Inade-
quate cooking facilities forced the prisoners to receive uncooked 
rations intermittently; frequently, certain rations could not be 
issued for lack of utensils . The corn meal, consisting of one-
sixth husk, caused much illness among the prisoners. The records 
show that Wirz brought these deficiencies to the attention of his 
superiors and urged them to relieve the situation. Little was ever 
accomplished, however, and the subject of feeding the prisoners has, 
to this day, remained a controversy . Confederate officials consis-
tently maintained that the rations were the same as those issued 
to Southern soldiers in the field. 
The stockade stream was contaminated by the cookhouse refuse, 
and the marsh land bordering the stream was turned into a three 
and one-half acre swamp as thousands of men constantly milled about . 
Inadequate sinks and poor sanitary habits led to latrine use of 
the entire swamp. Not only was it uninhabitable, but it became a 
breeding ground for disease. An unbearable stench rose from the 
area and swept throughout the stockade. IS 
wirz allowed the prisoners to dig wells for fresh water, even 
at the risk of having them conceal tunnels in the process. He 
tried desparately to reclaim the swamp and to improve the sanitary 
conditions . The project, initially delayed by lack of tools, was 
never completed because of the necessity of other work and the 
continued arrival of other prisoners. 19 
The frightful conditions turned the prison into a giant sick 
bay. Although the hospital was eventually removed from inside the 
filthy pen, facilities remained grossly inadequate. The sick were 
brought to the gates each morning to be examined. The haphazard 
arrangement and overcrowded conditions made it impossible to visit 
them in their quarters. More than ten times the number of doctors 
present were needed;20 the patient-doctor ratio was two hundred to 
4 
one . 21 Since only the worst cases could be admitted to the hospi -
tal, many seriously ill had to remain inside the stockade , and 
medicine was brought to them. On occasions in 1864, there were no 
medicines at a ll. 22 
Prisoners arriving from Richmond brought smallpox with them. 
To prevent its spreading , 3000 prisoners were vaccinated . Many 
of them, suffering from scurvy, died as the inflamed area deve l oped 
an ulcer and gangrene set in. The high ratio of deaths and anpu-
tations resulting from the vaccine caused the captives to accuse 
the Confederates of using poison vaccine . 2 3 Although the duties 
of Wirz did not include the hospital and care of the sick, he was 
soon to pay for all the inadequacies of Andersonvi lle Prison . 
From first till last Andersonville held 45 , 000 prisoners , the 
most at one time being about 32,000 . 24 Although the stockade had 
been enlarged by ten acres, the capacity never exceeded 17,500 . 
The deadline, that row of posts demarcating life and death, took 
away at l east fifteen feet around the inside; and the swamp, about 
three and one-half acres in the center , l eaving each man six square 
feet of space. With the severe congestion, the debi l itated condi-
tion of the prisoners on arrival , improper diet , polluted water, 
exposure to the elements , inadequate hospital facilities , and con-
tageous disease , it is not surprising that 13,000 Union prisoners 
died there. Nearly 3000 died in the month of August , almost 1 00 
a day .2 5 During t his month Wirz himself was very ill from over -
work and lack of assistance , but he hesitated to take a leave since 
there was no replacement for him. 26 
The dep l orable conditions caused some of the inmates to lose 
their sanity. Many became so dejected that they welcomed death . 
They committed suicide or forced their captors to kill them by 
crossing the deadline . The number of deaths along the deadline 
caused many prisoners to believe the rumor that the guards re-
ceived a thirty day furlough for each Yankee they kil led . 2 7 
Others tried to escape the misery by tunneling out of the prison 
or by running away from outside details . A great number did 
escape, but only 329 of the captives escaped permanent l y . The dogs 
used by the Confederates for hunting escapees a nd the d istance 
from Union territory made most escape attempts unsuccessful. 28 
Recaptured prisoners were punished by having to wear a ba ll 
and chain for the remainder of their captivity. Rations were with-
he l d for missing morning roll call , and punishment for minor offenses 
was two hours work . Contrary to the testimony of prisoners, 
Confederate Inspector Walter Bowie said tha t "Captain ,'lirz, the 
commander of the prison, is ver y firm and rigid in the disc i p line 
of the prisoners, and a t the same time exercises toward them a ll 
proper acts of kindness .,, 29 He helped make arrangements for six 
prisoners to journey to Washington with a petition expressing the 
demoralizing conditions at Andersonville and containing a p lea for 
the government intervention for parole or exchange of prisoners. 
Nothing ever came of the trip to ~Iashington. 30 
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Since guards could not be spared to administer internal dis -
cipline, the majority of the prisoners fell victim to the Raiders, 
a group of marauders from their own ranks who robbed and beat at 
will. After hearing pleas from the prisoners , Hirz organized the 
Regulators, a police force from among the Union cap tives, and 
issued the order to withhold rations until the culprits were 
caught and punished. General John Winder, the commander of the 
post, approved wirz's plan. The Union prisoners captured, tried, 
and sentenced the Raiders. Six were condemned to death by hang-
ing. Unfortunately this is the only deed that many prisoners 
credit to Wirz.31 
For most, he was their jailer, and his efforts against im-
possible odds remained invisible to them. As the only Confed-
erate officer in regular contact with the prisoners, he became 
the symbol of their misery and suffering. They united in describ-
ing him as a brute. 32 The most vehemen t description comes from 
John lVlcE lroy: 
He was an undersized, fidgety man IIli th an insignificant 
face, and a mouth that protruded like a rabbit's. His 
bright little eyes, like those of a squirrel or a rat, 
assisted in giving his countenance a look of kinship to 
the family of rodent animals--a genus which lives by 
stealth and cunning, subsisting on that which it can 
steal away from stronger and braver creatures. He 
was simply contemptabJ.e from whatever point of view he 
was studied. Gnatbrained, cOlilardly, and feeble-natured, 
he was not a quality that commanded respect from any 
one who knew him . 33 
Others have IIlri tten that with his Rebel escort he rode through 
the camp on an old gray horse brandishing his revolver and shouting 
obscenities in his broken English. They called him the "Fly ing 
Dutchman" and viewed him as a domineering and abusive brute, a 
thoroughly evil man without a semblance of humanity.34 Hesseltine 
writes that "Prisoners in confinement and in varying stages of 
illness were in no position to make objective judgements. It was 
easy for them to believe their jailers deliberately subjected 
them to hardships."35 
Contrary to the opinions of the prisoners is that of Confed-
erate inspectors. Although they attest to the horrors at Ander-
sonville, they unite in commend ing Wirz . In Hay, Major Thomas P. 
Turner wrote 
I wish to add a word in relation to the officer commanding 
the interior prison (the prison proper), Captain Wirz, who 
in my opinion, deserves great credit for the good sense and 
energy he has displayed in the management of the prison 
at Andersonville. He is the only man who seems to fully 
comprehend his important duties. He does the work of 
commandant, adjutant, clerk, and warden, and without his 
presence at Camp Sumter at this time everything ,~ould be 
chaos and confusion; in my opinion, at least two com-
missioned officers should be assigned to duty to assist 
him. 36 
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In August , Wirz again was praised by a Confederate inspector, 
Co l one l D. T. Chand l er: "Capt . Henry vlirz. . is entitled to 
commendation for his untiring energy and devotion to the discharge 
of the multifarious duties of his position , for which he is pre-
eminentl y qualified . "37 
In spite of these commendations of Wirz, the horrors of 
Andersonvi lle cannot be denied. In placing Andersonvil l e and wirz 
in proper historical perspective , several points must be consid-
ered . At the outbreak of the war neither side had had an organ-
ized prison system with a hierarchy of officers . Housing, a ration 
system and medical care for large numbers of captives were not in 
the war p lans . Northern prisons eventually resulted from definite 
p lans and were administered by experienced officers. Lieutenant 
Colonel W. Hoffman was ear l y appointed Commissary General of 
prisoners in the North and held the position throughout the war . 
Southern prisons, on the other hand, developed to meet the exi-
gencies of the moment , and not until 1 864 did the South appoint 
General John Winder to a similar, but l ess well defined , position. 38 
The best so lution had seemed to parole the prisoners . J. G. 
Randall and David Donald say that the "subject of the exchange of 
prisoners . . is at the heart of the p roblem and must be under-
stood before any comment on the treatment of prisoners can be 
a ttempted. "39 Early in the war, prison exchanges "ere handled 
through individual commanders; but as the war dragged on with an 
ever increasing number of captives, it was necessary to effect a 
p lan of exchange. In July, 1862, arrangements were made for a 
cartel: even exchange prisoners were not t o be denied further 
military activity, but the surplus captives who were paroled were 
not to bear arms again. With the cartel the prisoner situation 
was checked for awhile; however, several obstacles eventually 
caused the system of exchange under the cartel to collapse. From 
1863 on, the number of war prisoners cont inued to increase on both 
sides. A few exchanges did continue to take p lace , and unsuccess-
ful attempts were made to restore the cartel. In April, 1 864 , 
Grant, believing that the military power of the South had to be 
exhausted, ordered that all prison exchanges stop.40 
Mi litar ily the policy of non-exchange was probably correct, 
The North had suff icient manpower, and those captured from their 
ranks consumed Confederate supplies. The Southern prisoners , once 
released, would again make up the inadequate ranks of the Confed-
erate army. 41 l~hile the policy of exchange see-sawed, myriads of 
soldiers were taken captive and the pr ison rolls continually grew 
in both North and South. Captured and confined were approximately 
195,000 Northerners and 215,000 Confederates. Of these, over 
30,000 Union prisoners died (fifteen pe r cent) and nearly 26,000 
Confederates (twelve per cent). Forty-b~o thousand of the Union 
captives were held at Andersonville, and nearly 13,000 of them 
died there. 42 
Hesseltine writes 
Were the number of wounded prisoners known, or the number 
of soldiers suffering from camp disease and battle fa-
tigue at the time of their capture, the picture of suffer-
ing and death in prisons might become clearer. Certain 
it is, that the prisoners sent to Andersonville were 
weak and disease-ridden as a result of their long confine-
ment on Belle Isle in the James River, and that many were 
sick when they were captured. Most of the deaths in 
Andersonville came in the months after the serious over-
crowding had been relieved by sending all prisoners fit 
to travel to other prisons. In fact, the prison was, for 
most of its existence, a vast poorly organized, and inade-
quate hospital. 43 
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At the end of the war the South was desparately trying to care 
for hordes of prisoners. The transportation and supply system had 
collapsed; first rate officers could not be spared for prison duty 
for they were needed at the front as the Union armies made the 
final sweep across the South. Union prisoners were not much 
worse off than many of the soldiers of the Confederacy. These 
facts must be considered when judging the horrors at Andersonville. 
Randall and Donald write that "The sickening story of Anderson-
ville. . is not to be set down, in the manner of lurid prison 
literature, as a chapter in Confederate cruelty; it is the tragedy 
of an impossible situation forced by the barbarity of war.,,44 
Futch concedes that "war is hell" and that it cannot be denied 
that the scarcity of Southern resources contributed to the suffer-
ing and death at Andersonville, but he strongly charges that "What 
may be less obvious, though no less important, is that some of 
it came as a result of short sighted management and lack of admin-
istrative ability. ,,45 He indicts the officers for locating the 
bakery and cookhouse on the stream of drinking water, for placing 
the hospital inside the stockade, and for failing to arrange the 
make-shift dwellings of the prisoners in some order. 46 These were 
mistakes, perhaps due to lack of foresight, but no one could have 
had the foresight of Andersonville. Wirz had not been responsible 
for these decisions, but like the others, he fell short of the 
tasks that were assigned him--tasks, however, that were humanly 
impossible against the odds at Andersonville. 
On the question of exchange, Futch argues from a moral view-
point: "The breakdown of exchange in no way relieved the South of 
its obligations under the recognized rules of war to care properly 
for prisoners. When a nation at war is no longer able to wage 
war, it is duty-bound to give up the struggle. "47 An oppos-
ing opinion is found in Page,". the Federal authorities must 
share the blame for these things Lthe horrors of Andersonvill~7 
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'vi th the Confederates since they we l l knevl the inability of the 
Confederates to meet the reasonable wants of their prisoners of 
war, as they lacked a supply of their own needs , and since the 
Pederal authorities failed to exercise a humane policy in the ex-
change of those captured in battle ." 48 
As the evidence and historical interpretations are continu-
ally re-examined, U1e controversy is likely to continue. There 
seems to be no doubt among some that the real culprit was war--
that the dreadful things that happen during war are the fault of 
war itself rather than of individuals . It is true that the lack 
of a prison system and the mistaken judgment of officers in charge 
contributed to the suffering at Andersonville, but their tasks 
seem to have been impossible. Another truth is that the Northern 
policy of non-exchange, militarily sound or not, contributed to 
the deaths at Andersonville. And in condemning the South for 
treatment of prisoners of war, an important fact to remember is 
that twelve per cent of the Southern soldiers confined in Northern 
prisons also died. The North, in spite of its capabilities and 
resources , cared little better for its prisoners than did the South . 
But when the end came, someone had to pay for the sins of ,var. 
Although the leaders of the Confederacy and the whole South were 
indicted, Henry Wirz, alone, was destined to atone for the sins of 
Vlar, the sins (.If both North and South. 
By the end of September, 1864, vlhen Sherman had Atlanta in 
his grip, General Ivinder began moving the prisoners to other areas. 
In October after the comoletion of a new prison in Nillen, Georgia, 
the armament and equipment were taken from Andersonville, and all 
Andersonville prisoners except those too ill to travel were re-
moved . The advancing lines of Sherman soon forced the abandonment 
of the Millen prison and caused the Confederacy to spend the last 
months of 1864 and the early months of 1865 searching for a safe 
place to keep their captives . Winder , weary of the search, recom-
mended paroling those whose terms had expired. Robert Ould , t.he 
Southern officer in charge of exchange , was eventually successful 
in arranging an exchange . 49 
Prisoners, arriving in Savannah and Charleston , were met by 
neVIs correspondents who sent stories of their suffering to their 
home newspapers . The emanciated skeletons Vlere proof of the Rebel 
cruelty . The hatred generated by the 'var made it possible for the 
Northerners to believe that both the sadistic jailers and the 
perfidious leaders of the Confederacy were to blame. The Northern 
officials retaliated against Southern prisoners for the alleged 
cruelties perpetrated by t he Confederates . The psychosis engendered 
by the war did not end with the union victory but ran rampant 
long enough to bring about the mock trial and execution of Captain 
Henry lVirz , the Andersonvi lle jailor.50 
The war hysteria VIas intensified by Lincoln's assassination . 
Rutman has written that if North ern victory had not been tarnished 
by the assassination of Lincoln, the "rancor of war" might have 
vanished and Henry l'lirz might have gone home . He explains that 
after the assassination of Lincoln, " Secretary of War Edwin rl. 
Stanton assumed almost the role of a military dictator . 
9 
Stanton dec l ared to the world that Lincoln had been the victim of 
a grea t conspiracy directed against the North by Jefferson Davis 
and the Southern Confederacy. ,,51 
1·lhen the attempts to implicate the Confederate officers in 
the assassination of the President failed, Stanton pursued another 
course. He accused Davis and the Confederate leaders of conspir-
ing to murder Federa l prisoners of war. Rutman says , "It was in 
the pursuit of this second course , rather than as a result of pub-
lic agitation, that a vindictive administration seized upon Henry 
Wirz . ,,52 In acc using the Confederates, Stanton expected a l so to 
take attention away from the Northern policy of non-exchange, a 
policy which had caused much criticism in the North . 53 
At the time of his arrest, Wirz had not become a "cause 
celebre" in the North, but with his arrest and imprisonment in 
Washington and the announcement of his trial, the press directed 
the fury of the North upon him. As the hatred and hysteria of 
four years of war centered on this one man; Hirz the man died, and 
Wirz the legend was born . " 54 
Wirz, exhausted and suffering from the pain in his arm , had 
remained at Andersonville when the war was over . When Captain 
Henry Noyes arrived in ~lay , he confiscated the prison records and 
ordered wirz to accompany him to Genera l J. H. Wilson 's head-
quarters in l1acon. Wirz and the prison documents were sent to 
Washington , D. C.55 En route , fierce attacks were made on his life 
by ex- prisoners. In Louisville, he shaved away his beard and 
moustache and donned the disguise of a black suit and beaver hat 
to conceal him from the wrath of his enemies. 56 On l1ay 10 , 1865, 
Wirz was confined in the Old Capitol Prison, and for three months 
he languished there while the I'lar Department gathered evidence 
against him and the radical segment of the Northern press depicted 
h i m as the world 's greatest criminal. Under the direction of 
Stanton, Colonel Norton P. Chipman located and interviewed numer-
ous eye witnesses. His apparent purpose was to prepare a case to 
prove a general conspiracy among the Confederates and to prove 
specific charges of atrocities against Wirz. He would, thus, 
satisfy Stanton and the vindictives and the furious public . 57 
A mi l itary commission met on August 21, 1865, in the Court 
of Claims ' Hall to arraign vlirz for the Andersonville crimes . 
When Stanton read the first charge--a conspiracy charge much like 
that of the Lincoln trial- - he became enraged and dismissed the 
court. Wirz was accused of conspiring with Davis and other high 
ranking officials to murder prisoners. Stanton had been embar -
rassed by the Lincoln conspiracy charge and did not want to suffer 
the same again. 58 
The military commission next met on Wednesday, August 23, to 
begin the trial of Henry Wirz anew . The most important members of 
10 
the nine member commission were r1ajor General Lew Wallace , presi-
dent , and Colonel Norton P. Chipman, judge- advocate . \'Jhen the 
charges and specifications against Wirz were read, the names of 
Davis and certain others had been deleted . Charge I accused lhrz 
of conspiring with other Rebel leaders to "maliciously, wil-
fully , and traitorously . . injure the health and destroy the 
lives of Federal soldiers then being held as prisoners of war . " 
The charge maintained that he willfully neglected to furnish shel -
ter , adequate food, wood for cooking, necessary medicine and medi-
cal attendance, and clean water, and that he inflicted cruel , 
unusual and infamous punishment on the prisoners . He was further 
charged with vaccinating them with poison vaccine . 5 9 
Under Charge II lVirz was accused of murder , in violation of 
the laws and customs of war . This charge included thirteen speci-
fications of murder . wirz allegedly shot three men himself, 
ordered the guards to kill four others , beat to death two prison-
ers , allowed the dogs to ki ll one, left two to die in the stocks 
and one in the chain gang . Two of these prisoners lived one day, 
two lived five days, and one lived ten days after his punishment 
had been inflicted . Yet , not one victim's name could be given . 60 
When wirz was called on to immediately enter a plea , James 
Hughes and Charles Peck withdrew as counselors for the accused. 
With tears in his eyes , Wirz expressed his regret to Peck who 
assured him that he would be better off "in the hands of the Judge -
Advocate than if defended by special counsel . "(~hey had 
only been informed at eight o ' clock that the court would reconvene 
that day . ) \'Jallace announced that the judge- advocate Ivas by law 
the attorney for the defendant and adjourned the trial to give him 
time to prepare a case;61 however , when the trial began the follow-
ing day, Louis Schade , a fellow countryman of \Virz, and o. S . 
Baker were permitted to appear as counsel for \,yirz . 62 
After the specifications were read , the counsel for the 
accused entered Wirz ' s plea which contained five major points : 
\hrz was protected under the Johnson-SherMan agreement of sur-
render; Captain Noyes violated his promise that wirz would not be 
arrested and that he would have safe conduct to his home; the 
military conunission had no jurisdiction to try him; the charges 
and specifications should be dropped because they were so vague 
and indefinite and because he was not guilty of any offense pun-
ishable under the laws of war; and that he had been arraigned on 
identical charges on August 21 , and could not be brought before 
the court again . 63 
The judge-advocate then entered into a lengthy discussion of 
the p leas submitted by Wirz and his counsel. Chipman said the 
court had already decided the issue of the charges and specifica-
tions and that the question of military jurisdiction was to be 
argued at a later date . Concerning the question of "double-jeo-
pardy , " Chipman read a letter from Judge Advocate General Holt 
which stated that a person could be put in double jeopardy only if 
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a formal acqui tta l or conviction was passed by the fi rs t court . 
"A withdrawa l of any charge may be made by the judge- advocate, wi th 
the assent of the court ; and upon such charge , if the interests 
of public justice require it , the part y may be again arraigned . " 
This was the case of Wirz , he claimed. The fourth point concerned 
the promise of safe conduct g i ven to Wirz by Captain Noyes . Chipman 
said that it was simply a vio l ation of an agreement between Wirz 
and Noyes and had nothing to do wi th t he military commis sion . 
Finally, Chipman argued that the Johnson - Sherman agreement was not 
a general amnesty or pa rdon. This agreement did not absolve Wirz 
from the crimes he committed in vio l a tion of the laws of war. 
After the judge- advocate concluded his a r g ument s , the court was 
cleared for deliberation. It vIas announced that the court sustained 
the motion of the judge-advocate and overruled the p leas of Ivirz . 
I-lirz p leaded not gui lty to each of the charges and specifications . 64 
The testimony of the tria l then commenced and lasted for 
sixty- three days , ending on October 24, 1865 . During the trial 
the p ress continually demonstrated its prejudice through the de-
scriptions of Wirz: 
Ye t the central f igure in the room i s after a ll , thi s 
Swiss-American, Henry Wirz , whom God p robab l y made , and 
yet whom no man thinks of as a brother. Is there fami l y 
relationship among fiends? Let us be thank f ul tha t this 
one can claim neither American birth o r education . 
There isn't much of the original v illain in his appearance, 
though he looks like a man utter l y without conscience and 
r eady t o do , for a consideration, almost any infernal deed 
set for him by a superior . 65 
The trial was temporar ily adjourned in September when Wirz became 
ill. The press reported that his illness was severe ner vousness , 
which increased each time some new accusation against him surfaced. 
When the trial resumed several days later, \·lir z was compel led by 
weakness to lie o n a sofa during the trial proceedings. o6 
During the course of the t wo- month trial, 48 witnesses testi-
f ied. As witness after witness t ook the stand, a resume of the 
horrors at Andersonville Prison wa s p resented . ~\ost of the wi t-
nesses for the prosecution testi f ied to the evi l side of Wir z ' s 
nature, but only a dozen or so claimed to have seen him kill pris-
oners. These wi tnesses could contribute the most minute detai l s 
of the murders , everything but the victims ' names, in spite of the 
fac t that some of them linger ed for several day s . 67 
The judge-advocate a lone had the pmler to summon \vi tnesses, 
a nd he re fused to issue subpoenas to anyone who coul d testify to 
similar conditions in Nor thern prisons . Some very impo r tant wit-
nes ses for the defense were not al l owed to testify. Chipman 
exc luded or hurried over t e st imony concern ing efforts to improve 
prison conditions and labored over horrible condition s at Ander-
sonville and the evil character of Wirz . 68 
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The prosecution had some outstanding wi tnesses who c o ntri -
but ed vi t a l testimony . One pr omi nent witness was Felix de J. a 
Ba ume, who c l aimed t o have wi tnessed c rue l ties c ommitted by Ih r z . 
On his fi r s t day a t t he p r ison, he c l a i med t o have s e en Wi r z shoot 
t wo men, on e of whom l a t er di e d . He a l so saw a ma n d i e in the 
stocks a nd one k illed whi l e reach i n g under the deadl i ne. Most of 
h is incr iminating t esti mony cente r ed on Wirz, not the pr i s on con-
di tions. 69 De l a Baume t e stified that he was the grand nephew of 
Lafayette , thus c a tching the trust of ever yone . On No vember 21, 
e leven day s a f ,t e r the execution of lVirz, he was recognized by 
some German s o ldiers in Washington as a deserter from the Seventh 
Ne w York Volunteers. His real name was Felix Oeser. 70 
Another in f luential witness fo r the p ro s ecution was Geo r g e w. 
Gray . Gray testifie d that Wirz killed his companion, William 
Stewart , for no reason , as they c a rried a body to t he dead house . 
This accusatio n provoked an outburst from Wirz which the news-
papers portrayed as a sign of his guilt. Later, in his closing 
statement , wirz said that there was no such person as William 
Stewart. He was found only in the imagination of Gray . His n a me 
could not be found on any of the books of Andersonv ille prison, 
and no other witness had ever heard o f him . 7l 
The testimony of Confederates who were called by the prosecu-
tion corroborated the horrors at Andersonville but exonerated 
Wirz from blame . A major piece of evidence was the D. T . Chandler 
report which contained descriptions of the wretched conditions 
in the stockade and hospital and denunciations of the officers 
at the post, all except Wirz. (Chandler ' s praise of Wirz has b e en 
cited earlier.) During the trial he gave the following testimony 
which was not praise, yet it was not incriminating. 
Facts have come to my kn owl edge in relation to Captain 
Wirz of which I had no suspicion at the time I recommended 
him as an efficient officer . He seemed to me to be ener-
getic and industrious and attended to his duties, and I 
neither saw nor heard anything to indicate cruel treatment 
of the prisoners on his part, and I made some inquiries 
about it. I will explain to the court. I have been a 
prisoner myse l f , and I know the unwillingness of prisoners 
to make complaints in the presence of those who have 
power over them, and for that reason, I took the men aside 
and questioned them so that Wirz could not hear me as to 
any complaints against him . The complaints were mostly of 
insufficient food, of want of shelter, and of clothing; 
no complaints were made about him to me . 72 
An Andersonville surgeon , Dr . John C. Bates, and Confederate 
officer, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Persons , also testified to 
the horrible conditions in the stockade and hospital but said 
Captain vlirz was not responsible for the terrible conditions , that 
he had nothing to do with the location of the stockade, the over-
crowded conditions or the lack of she lter. (In his final statement, 
Wirz used the testimony of t hese b/o and that of Chandl er as 
s t a t ements of fact that he was not responsibl e for the horrible 
conditions at Andersonville . ) 73 
Two clergymen associated with Andersonville testified the 
same as Bates , Persons and Chandler. They described the prison 
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as a crowded, filthy stockade fu l l of suffering and dying men who 
were covered with vermin; but they, too , characterized Wirz as a 
kind individual who offered any assistance that he coul d. There 
were no restrict ions on what he allowed to be taken into the 
s t ockade--money , c l othing , or other items; lVirz had seemed anxious 
to have care and attention given to the prisoners. 74 
As the trial came to an end, Wirz again found himself with-
out counsel . They had \vi thdravTn ",hen Chipman refused to give 
them adequate time to prepare their closing statement. Wirz 
stated his own defense in a l etter which was read to the court. 
I n a n swering t he conspiracy charge , he pointed out that not one 
witness had testified to such a conspiracy and that 
if no living witness could be found to lend even the 
weakest support to the monstrous supposition, surely 
if it was not all a myth , a dream of the imagination 
there could be found . some scrap of documentary 
evidence , to give it at l east the semblance of probabil-
ity.75 
On Charge I, he continued by arguing that 
Those co consparitors /sic7 were all in the custody . 
of the government; yet-not one of them was called upon 
to take his place beside me and answer to this question 
for his crime; . they have all been favored with 
clemency a n d their names have been expunged from the 
charge. 76 
(At this point, lVirz cited the testimony of Chandler , Bates, and 
Persons to show that he was not responsible for the privations 
and sufferings at Andersonville . ) 77 
Concerning Charge II, Wirz stated that only two of the cases 
of murder that he was charged with had any definiteness: the 
case of William Stewart and Chickamauga . As stated earl ier, 
Stewart was a fictional character who could be found on no pris-
on record, only in Gray ' s mind. Chickamauga, however, was a 
rea l prisoner at Andersonvil l e. His murder was recounted by at 
least twenty witnesses , each with a different story.78 
wirz recounted the incident, stating that Chickamau ga was 
creating a disturbance, so Wirz himself was called into the stock-
ade. I,hen the prisoner said that he wanted to be killed, Wirz 
replied that he would oblige and drew his pistol. The prisoner 
became frightened and went outside the deadline. Before leaving , 
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wirz said he tried to scare the prisoner fur t her by telling the 
guard to shoot him if he crossed the deadline . When the Captain 
left, Chickamauga went back across the deadline and was shot by 
the guard . 79 
Throughout the trial much testimony had centered on the 
a ttacks of fe r ocious dogs. (Specification eleven concerned the 
murder of a pr isoner by the dogs . ) wirz said that he was connect-
ed with only one such case--a man named Frenchy who repeatedly 
escaped. On one escape, Frenchy had fallen from a tree and wa s 
attacked by the dogs. Wirz reported that he had driven the dogs 
off and that the man s uffered only bruises and scratches. He was 
exchanged when the first opportunity came . BO 
Wirz had thus answered the murder charges. Other points he 
made in his defense were that he wa s not aware that the means of 
p unishment at Andersonville were "unusual or cruel," that rations 
were stopped for one day because of the confusion of the Raiders 
and that rations were the same as those for Confederate soldiers, 
that the condition of his arm would have prevented his beating or 
attacking the prisoners , and that the vaccine charge was as un-
reasonable as to make him responsible for unskillful amputations 
or improper doses of medicine . He concluded his case with the 
following p leas : "May God so direct and enlighten you in your 
deliberation that your reputation for impartiality and justice 
may be upheld , my character vindicated, and the few days of my 
natural life spared to my helpless family ." BI 
When the judge-advocate proceeded to close the case, he be-
gan with a lengthy discussion of the jurisdiction of the court . 
He said the President had the constitutional authority to estab-
lish the military court to try military crimes and argued that 
the prisoner before the court was accused of crimes unknown to 
civil law--crimes which were in violation of war. He said wirz 
wa s a belligerent acting in his own territory on the o r ders of 
his superiors and concluded that the war was not over , that there 
was still the threat of public danger . B2 
Chipman next discussed the horrible conditions at Anderson-
ville, giving a detai l ed and passionate account of the conspiracy 
and the sadistic means of achieving its end . After accusing the 
Confederates of selecting a site that would reap a large portion 
of deaths, he cited the testimony of specific individuals . B3 
Ambrose Spencer, a Unionist from Andersonville, had testi fied 
earlier that he once overheard General John l'linder say , "I am going 
to build a pen here that will ki ll more damned Yankees than can 
be destroyed in the front."B4 In connection with Charge II, 
Chipman examined the cruelties of the dogs , the stocks , the dead-
line, the chain gang , and the stopping of rations . aS 
Ih th this, the judge-advocate closed his case, and the court 
was cleared for deliberation. Upon reconvening they announced 
that they had found the accused, Henry Wirz , guilty of the speci -
fications to Charge I after rewor din g it to read as follows: 
The said Henry Wirz, did combine, confederate and conspire 
with them, the said Jefferson Davis, James A. Seddon, 
and others whose names are unknown. . who were then 
engaged in armed rebellion against the United States, 
maliciously, traitorously , and in violation of the laws 
of war, to impair and injure the health and to destroy 
the lives by subjecting to torture and great suffering 
. . . large numbers of federal prisoners. . held . 
at Andersonville. 86 
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In light of the evidence, the commission had re-entered the names 
of Davis and others. 
Wirz was then p ronounced guilty of Charge II. The dates in 
the specifications of murder had been changed to agree with the 
testimony of the witnesses, one date having been changed from 
June to September. Wi rz had been on sick leave in Au gust when 
some of the victims were supposedly killed by him. 87 Throughout 
the trial there was no evidence to show that such a conspiracy had 
existed, nor was there any proof that Hirz had ever murdered any 
one at Andersonville; to this day such proof has not been p resented. 88 
The court sentenced him to be hanged , and on November 3, 1865, 
President Johnson sealed the fate of Henry Wi rz when he signed a n 
order that the execution of Wirz be carried out on Friday, November 
10, 1865, between the hours of six o'clock A. M. and twelve 
o'clock noon. 89 
On November 10, the crowd began arriving early for the public 
execution. Two hundred spectators held tickets for positions in-
side the courtyard . (There had been requests for a thousand.) 
The rest pe rched in the tops of trees or on housetop s; some even 
sat atop the Capitol dome a quarter-mile away. The Union officers 
arrived at ten o'clock to take the Captain to the prison yard. 
They tried to pinion his arms behind his back, but the handcuffs 
would not slip from his- swollen ri gh t arm. Dressed in a black 
shroud, I'lirz made his way to the courtyard, approached the scaf-
fold, and mounted the steps with a dignity that disappointed those 
who expected to see a cringing coward in the face of dea th. The 
order was read stating the findings of the court, the condemned 
man was given the last rites of the Catholic church, and the noose 
was adjusted around his neck as the crowd, mostly soldiers, shouted, 
"Hang him." "Andersonville." " Remember Andersonville." At 
exactly ten thirty, the death spring was released, and the in-
famous Andersonville commandant fell to his death. 90 with atone-
ment made for the sins of war, Hirz ,vas laid to rest in a grave 
site admist the Lincoln conspirators. 9l 
Stories had continued to circulate to the bitter end. The 
night before hi s execution, the Northern press was informed that 
wirz had made a statement imp lica ting Jefferson Davis and that the 
public would soon hear the confession. This last desperate a ttemp t 
to connect Davis with the atrocities at Andersonville failed. 
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Father Boyle, Wirz' s priest , and Louis Schade , his lawyer, both 
claimed that Wirz was offered a pardon if he would implicate Davis 
but that he refused, saying he knew nothing of President Davis. 
Jefferson Davis and the others who had been imprisoned were never 
brought to trial , and with the exception of Davis, all we re soon 
released. 92 
A second incident, which was supposed to have occurred some 
weeks earlier, was related the day after his death. The p rison 
guard claimed to have prevented Wirz from being killed by his wife 
when she tried to pass a capsule of poison to him as they kissed. 
The story does not reveal her motives--if she wanted to kill her 
"monstrous" husband or if she attempted to cheat the public of its 
reven ge by aiding him in a su i cide. The guard ' s story as it 
appeared in the New York Times has the quality of a sensational 
novel. The story was obviously circulated to weaken the noble 
manner in which wirz faced death and to further blacken his 
character. 93 
To his death wirz claimed his innocence . He left behind a 
statement and a wish : "11y life is demanded as atonement. I am 
willing to give it , and I hope that after avlhile I will be judged 
differently from what I am now . ,,94 The people in the South knew 
very little of wirz during the time he was commandant at Anderson-
ville, but subsequent developments called them to defend his name. 
Through hTirz , the entire South had been defamed; so through his 
defense, Southern honor would be restored . 95 
In 1905 when a Georgia Chapter of the United Daughters of the 
Confederacy decided to erect a monument honoring hTirz, a bitter 
controversy raged across the country , preventing the monument from 
being placed at Andersonville. Feder al authorities refused to 
have the monument placed inside either Andersonville National 
Cemetery or the Prison Park . The officials agreed to remove derog-
atory signs concerning the Confederacy and the South but the women 
responsible for the monument r emained adamant, and the memorial 
to Wirz was unvei l ed by his daughter on May 12 , 1909, in the 
village of Andersonville. 96 
The controversial monumen t sti l l stands in the center of the 
tiny Civil War town, just a few yards from the rails that brought 
13 , 000 men to their death. In 191 9 it was defaced with paint , 
but within a day all the paint had been cleaned away. In 1958 the 
Georgia Legislature defeated a bill that ca l led for repairing and 
clean ing the monument . The leading opponent was Representative 
U. S . Lancaster , the nephew of an Andersonville guard. Lancaster 
claimed that the Confederate guards at the prison hated Ihrz. 97 
Although the abuses of time have threatened the inscriptions , 
the passages are still visible . The inscriptions present a 
defense of Henry vlirz and Andersonville : 
Front Side 
In memory of Captain Henry Wirz, C. S. A. Born 
Zurich, Switzerland, 1822. Sentenced to death and exe-
cuted at Washington, D. C., Nov. 10, 1865. 
. To rescue his name from the stigma attached to it 
by embittered prejudice, this shaft is erected by the 
Georgia Division, United Daughters of the Confederacy. 
Second Side 
Discharging his duty with such humanity as the 
harsh circumstances of the times, and the policy of the 
foe permitted, Captain Wirz became at last the victim 
of misdirected popular clamor. 
He was arrested in time of peace, while under the 
protection of a parole, tried by a military commission 
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of a service to which he did not belong and condemned to 
ignominious death on charges of excessive cruelty to 
Federal prisoners. He indignantly spurned a pardon, 
proffered on condition that he would incriminate President 
Davis and thus exonerate himself from charges of which both 
were innocent. 
Third Side 
It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not 
to exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the 
ranks to fight our battles. At this particular time to 
release all rebel prisoners North, would insure Sherman's 
defeat and would compromise our safety here. 
August 18, 1864 Ulysses S. Grant 
Fourth Side 
When time shall have softened passion and prejudice, 
when reason shall have stripped the mask of misrepresenta-
tion, then justice, holding even her scales, will require 
much of past censure and praise to change places. 
December, 1888 Jefferson Davis 98 
Chipman, enraged by the dedication of the monument, published 
a more detailed account of the evidence concerning the Wirz trial. 
He claimed that the Daughters of the Confederacy were challenging 
the proceedings of the trial and denouncing the witnesses, that 
they were declaring the responsibility of the Federal government 
for the suffering at Andersonville, and that they were proclaim-
int Wirz a martyr. 99 
A long while has passed, and the judgment of Wirz is still 
being challenged. Historians agree that Andersonville was the 
result of a crippled Confederacy and that war causes horrible 
things to happen; however, they differ in their indictment of 
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Henry Wirz. Although no one seriously believes that there ever 
was a conspiracy or that there is any evidence to sustain the 
murder charges against Wirz , some still view him as a fiendish 
creature who was justly punished . They condemn him because he had 
an ill nature, a harsh tongue, and a threatening manner, and 
because many prisoners have left records of their hatred of him. 
The testimony of his Confederate superiors is disregarded; dis-
regarded, too, is the fact that to secure the prisoners and to 
discipline them was his job. But well remembered is that he 
fa iled to maintain the stockade facilities in a satisfactory man-
ner. That he tried against insurmountable odds counts for little; 
obviously, the task would have required an administrative genius. 
It is not ironic justice that Henry Wirz was the last victim of 
Andersonville; rather, the story of Henry Wirz is the tragedy of 
a man rushed to an untimely death as the passions of war demanded 
a scapegoat. 
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CRITICAL ESSAY ON SOURCES 
The most valuable primary source for a study of Andersonville 
Prison· and Henry Wirz is The War of the Rebellion : A Compilation 
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 
vols. (Washington, 1880-1901) . Contained within the series is an 
eight volume set dealing with prisons and prisoners . Host of the 
information concerning the Andersonville period is found in vol -
umes VI, VII , VIII. The material consists of the reports of in-
spectors and the reports and correspondence of prison officials. 
A second major source, The Trial of Henry Wirz, 40 Cong . , 2 
Sess., House Executive Document 23 (Serial 1331), presents the 
trial testimony and an account of the trial proceedings. In using 
the testimony, extreme caution is necessary, for the reliability 
of the witnesses is questionable. The real value lies inthe sup-
port it gives in reconstructing the prejudiced atmosphere surround-
ing the ~virz trial . Further evidence concerning the prevailing 
prejudice is found in the New York Times, Jan. --Nov. 1865. 
Two primary accounts holding wirz directly responsible for 
Andersonville are Ambrose Spencer, A Narrative of Andersonville 
Drawn from the Evidence Elicited on the Trial of Henry wirz, the 
Jailer. With the Argument of Colonel N. P. Chipman, Judge-Advocate 
(New York, 1866) and Norton P. Chipman, The Tragedy of Andersonville: 
Trial of Captain Henry Wirz--the Prison Keeper (San Francisco, 1911). 
The accounts of prisoners contribute much to an understanding 
of the situation at Andersonville; however, most of them are 
bitterly partisan accounts and must be read critically. John 
McElroy , Andersonville: A Story of Rebel Military Prisons (Green-
wich, Conn., 1962; first published 1879) is a modern abridgment by 
Philip Van Doren Stern. McElroy chronicles the agony suffered at 
Andersonville and depicts Wirz as the leading villain. John L. 
Ransom, John Ransom's Diary (New York, 1963 ; first published 1881) 
is evidence of the psychological strain the prisoners suffered. 
A careful reading reveals the developing psychosis of Ransom as 
he becomes more and more critical of Wirz. 
Other prisoner accounts are William H. Allen, "One Hundred 
and Ninety Days in Rebel Prisons," Annals of Iowa, XXXVIII (winter 
1966), 222 - 38; s. M. Dufur, Over the Dead-Line, or Tracked by 
Blood-Hounds (Burlington, Vt . , 1902); Milton E. Flower, ed., Dear 
Folks at Home: The Civil War Letters of Leo W. and John I. Farrer, 
with an Account of Andersonville (Carlisle, Penn., 1963); Warren 
L . Goss , The Soldier ' s Story of His Captivity at Andersonville, 
Belle Isle and Other Rebel Prisons (Boston, 1868) . 
In contrast to the preceeding works is James Madison Page, 
The True Story of Andersonville Prison: A Defense of Major Henry 
Wirz (New York, 1908) . Page, a former prisoner of Andersonville , 
portrays vlirz as a kind individual and defends him against the 
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negative accounts. He includes "Schade to the American Public," 
a most important source written by Wirz ' s attorney . Another de-
fense of Wirz published in the same year is Sarah W. Ashe, 
Trial and Death of Henry Wirz, with Other Matters Pertaining 
Thereto (Raleigh, 1908) . 
The two best secondary sources of Andersonville and Wirz 
are Ovid L. Futch, History of Andersonville Prison (Indian Town, 
, Fla., 1969) and William Best Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons : A 
Study in War Psychology (Columbus , Ohio , 1930) . The work by Futch 
is an extensive history which attempts to explain vlhat happened 
at Andersonville and why it happened. Although gener al l y objec-
tive , his attitude toward wirz is obviously colored by the prejudice 
found in prisoner accounts . He records that wirz was neither 
guilty of the conspiracy charge nor the murder charges, yet his 
description leaves wirz standing as one deserving of punishment. 
Hesseltine's underlying theory is that the dreadful things that 
happen during war are not the fault of individuals, but war it-
self . Andersonville , like the other prisons , was such a tragedy; 
and Wirz was a victim of the psychosis that comes with \var. Another 
source dealing with the same subject is the introduction to William 
Best Hesseltine, ed., Civil War Prisons (Kent, Ohio, 1962). 
Peggy Sheppard , Andersonville Georgia USA (Leslie, Ga., 
1973) is a collection of twelve stories concerning Andersonville 
and Wirz . Included is the controversy of the Wirz monument. 
Sources illustrating that the controversy concerning Wirz still 
exists are Rober t E. and Katharine M. Morseberger, "After Ander-
sonville: The First War Crimes Trial , " Civil War Times Illustrated, 
XIII (July 1974) , 30-4 1 , and Darrett B. Rutman, "The War Crimes and 
Trial of Henry Wirz, " Civi l War History , VI (June 1960) , 117 - 133. 
Each examines the evidence and the trial proceedings. The Horse-
bergers , while finding wirz innocent of the charges, conclude 
that he was justly punished. Rutman sees him as a scapegoat, 
the victim of a legal lynching . 
Two final sources , John S . Blay, The Civil War : 
Profile (New York , 1958) and J . G. Randall and David 
War and Reconstruction (Lexington, Hass ., 1969), are 
whi ch cont ain valuable information. 
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BRANDY STATION: THE TURNING POINT 
In the summer of 1863, the cavalry of the Army of Northern 
Virginia and its commander, General James Ewell Brown Stuart, were 
riding high. The Confederate troopers were at the crest of a 
string of continuous victories over their Northern counterparts, 
and could look back on such exploits as riding around the Army of 
the Potomac in the Peninsular Campaign l and carrying off the 
audacious Chambersburg raid. 2 The cavalry was still romantic, 
even after two years of warfare, and feats such as these made it 
so. And with such background, no one thought the Federals might 
soon become worthy adversaries , least of all Stuart himself. 
After the close of the Chancellorsville campaign, Jeb Stuart's 
cavalry headquarters was moved to Culpeper County, Virginia, so 
the men could rest and recuperate. While there, the main body of 
cavalry was joined by Beverly Robertson ' s brigade from North 
Carolina, "Grumble" Jones (so-called due to his acerbic personality) 
from the Shenandoah Valley, and most of Wade Hampton's men from 
South Carolina and Mississippi. Men from the commands of the two 
Lees (Fitzhugh and W. H. F. "Rooney") and Jones' brigade returned 
from furlough and fresh mounts; Major Beckham's horse artillery 
was also reinforced. 3 Altogether, on May 30, 1863, Stuart had five 
brigades with 21 regiments, 9,536 men total, his strongest force 
ever . 4 The showman in Stuart prompted him to stage a review on the 
fifth of June, complete ,vith a mock charge and cannons firing blanks 
to delight the ladies in attendance; a second review, on the eighth, 
was attended by General Robert E. Lee (who vetoed the planned mock 
charge, to save wear and tear on the horses). After the second 
review Stuart's men prepared for early movement on the ninth, to 
cover the start of Lee's invasion of the North. 5 
The Federal cavalrymen were aware of the Confederate concentra-
tion, though prone to overestimating Stuart's strength. 6 The great-
est fear of the Northern commanders was another Confederate raid, 
and most thought that to be Stuart's mission. 7 To pre-empt such a 
raid, General Alfred Pleasonton, commanding the cavalry of the Army 
of the Potomac , determined to attack Stuart;8 Pleasonton, accord-
ing to his own account, used 10,981 cavalry and infantry.9 
Unaware that so many of the enemy were near , the Confederates, 
preparing to head North, were poorly positioned to repel an attack. lO 
Fi tz Lee's brigade, under Colonel Tom l1unford, was miles from 
Fleetwood, north of the Hazel River , near Oak Shade Church. Rooney 
Lee was further south , picketing tlel ford ' s Ford. "Grumble" Jones ' 
Laurel Brigade was near Beverly Ford and St. James Church, picket-
ing the ford and Rappahannock Station, the railroad crossing. Wade 
Hampton's brigade was in reserve near Fleetwood, south of the 
railroad. Robertson's brigade was along the river below the railroad, 
Charles A. Hood 
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~icketing Kelly ' s and the l ower fords . One battery of horse artil -
lery, Breathed's , was with Fitz Lee's brigade near Oak Shade; the 
other four batteries were between Jones ' brigade and the 
Rappahannock River , unsupported, the weak spot of the dispositions . ll 
During the dark and hazy night of the eighth,12 the Federals 
crept up to the river, camped silently and without fires , and 
Ivaited to attack. 13 The Second and Third Cavalry Divisions, with 
Russell's infantry brigade , were commanded by David Gregg; the 
First Cavalry Division and Ames' infantry brigade were under John 
Buford. Each cavalry division had with it two light batteries of 
J horse artillery.14 Buford was to cross at Beverly Ford, Gregg at 
Kelly's Ford. Pleasonton, thinking Stuart was concentrated at 
Culpeper Court House , ordered his men to rendezvous at Brandy 
Station and then simultaneously attack Stuart's p resumed position . 
The infantry was to cover the lines of retreat. Buford crossed 
first, at dawn. IS 
"Grumble" Jones heard the battle's opening clash as the sixth 
Virginia , on picket, met the Federals only a few hundred yards in 
front of the unsupported Confederate artillery . The Seventh 
Virginia, the grand guard, was led into the attack by Jones him-
self, many troopers mounting so fast they did not have time to put 
on their boots or saddle their horses . The Seventh's charge was 
rep ulsed and a mass of fleeing Confederates and advancing Federals 
rode over the Confederate guns , whose crews were forced to defend 
themselves with pistols and sponge staffs; but canister from 
Captain J . H. Hart's two howitzers beat the Federals back, allow-
ing the rest of the guns to escape and unlimber west of St. James 
Church , where they were joined by Jones and his men. But if 
Federal Colonel B. F . "Grimes " Davis , l eading the attack , had not 
been killed at the ford (Causing the narrow road to clog up with 
men) , it is likel y that the guns would have been taken at the very 
start of the action. 16 
At h i s headquarters on F l eetwood Heights, Stuart, having heard 
the gunfire from Beverly Ford and received a message from Jones , 
set about to reinforce his l ines . 17 Hampton, minus one regiment 
left in reserve at Brandy Station , was sent to Jones' right; Rooney 
Lee was sent to Jones ' left. Stuart intended to bring in Fitz 
Lee ' s br i gade also bu t the o r ders he sent were unclear (Hunford ' s 
report reveals they mere l y said to corne "this way"), so Hunford 
j ust went to Welford ' s Ford and effectively took himself out of the 
action . 
I n the meantime , Jones had fo r med a l i n e around St . James 
Church . Federals rushed out of the woods in a charge and wer e 
repulsed by Beckham ' s guns , so the Twelfth Virginia, Fourteenth 
Virginia, and Thir t y - fifth Battalion countercharged; they pushed 
the Federals back into the woods and then withdrew . Hampton and 
Lee had corne u p on Jones ' f l anks , forming a line of batt l e with a 
sharp right angle around St . James Church . Buford , opposite the 
angle , was blocked;18 facing a deep re-entrant in his lines, his 
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flanks were over lapped and he was forced to withdraw part of his 
forces to protect his lines of retreat. 19 
Because of the unorthodox position of the Confederate artil -
lery, his overes timation of the size of the Confederate forces , 
and the hard fight Buford was having, Pleasonton concluded that 
Stuart had been ready for the assault. 20 His 7:40 message to 
Hooker reads: "The enemy is in strong cavalry force here. We 
have had a severe fight . They were al"are of our mov ement , and Ivere 
prepared.,,2l Though he had as yet receiv ed no word from Gregg, 
Pl easonton decided to just hold on in the Confederate front and 
wait for his left-hand column to hit the enemy's rear . The 
Confederates were driving Buford back toward the river when Gregg's 
guns were heard in the Confederate rear . 
Though ordered to cross the Rappahannock at dawn, Colonel 
Alfred N. Duffie's Second Division had started late and had unex-
plained trouble getting to Kelly 's Ford, so Pleasonton's left did 
not cross the river until after fi v e o ' clock in the morning. 22 
Gregg bore on toward Stevensburg and, at a fork in the road two 
miles from the ford , sent Duffie on toward Stevensburg while he 
headed for Brandy Station . 
Stuart's adjudant, Major H. B. HcClellan, and some couriers 
were the only Confederates on Fleetwood Heights,23 since the regi-
ment Hampton had left in reserve at Brandy Station had been sent 
to meet Duffie at Stevensburg. MCClellan sent urgent messages to 
Stuart asking for help ; at first Stuart did not believe it possible 
that the enemy was in his rear (since Robertson should have been 
guarding the right flank), but more messages and gunfire from 
Fleetwood soon confirmed the initial report. Stuart then ordered 
Jones to send his guns and two regiments to Fleetwood, and followed 
in person; when he arrived, Stuart saw the danger and ordered in 
two of Hampton's regiments. 24 
Low on ammunition , Lieutenant John W. Carter ' s six- pounder 
was at the base of Fleetwood Heights; McClellan got the gun onto 
the hill and had it begin a slow cannonade of Gregg ' s approaching 
column. Gregg stopped his advance to form up for an all - out 
attack, naturally assuming that such a commanding position Ivould 
be held in strength; this delay enabled the Confederates to arrive 
just in time to keep Gregg from gaining the key to the battle . 25 
Beginning shortly after 10:00 A. M., Fleetwood Heights became 
the scene of " ... the greatest cavalry fighting of the war.,,26 The 
Twelfth Virginia and Thirty-fifth Battalion came up the hill just 
as Carter ' s gun, ammunition exhausted, was withdrawing and Colonel 
Sir Percy Wy ndham's First New Jersey was coming up the other side; 
the Confederates attacked without going into line , so only the 
first ranks were effective and the charge was ridden off by the 
Federals. Wyndham got three guns onto the hill; t1ajor C. E. 
Flournoy ' s Sixth Virginia and then the Thirty-fifth Battalion rode 
over them, but both Confederate units were forced back. Lunsford 
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Lomax ' s Eleventh Virginia carne in next and captured the guns for 
the third and final time , turning them on the Federals , who were 
forced back toward Stevensburg . Confederate guns were brought u p , 
their gunners at times having to fight hand - to- hand . Then 
Hampton ' s men carne up in line abreast; Young ' s Cobb Legion and 
Black ' s First South Carolina hit the Federal front , while Baker ' s 
First North Carolina and Waring ' s Jeff Davis Legion swept around 
the hill to hit the Federal right . They pushed the Federals off 
the hill and their pursuit was stopped only by Confederate guns 
mistakenly firing on them , which enabled the Federals to get to the 
woods . While Hampton secured F l eetwood Heights , Harman and White 
attacked again , cutting off the part of the First New Jersey that 
was on Barbour ' s Hill; the rest of the Federal regiment formed a 
rear guard under Wyndham ' s personal control on the Brandy Station 
road , repul sing two attacks . 27 
The Con f ederate troopers were unaware that the fragment of the 
First New Jersey on Barbour ' s Hill was unsupported , and the Con -
federate artillerymen did not even know they were there; taking 
the only avenue of escape open to them , the Federals rode over and 
through the guns , cutting their way back to Gregg . One gunner, 
Private Sud l ey , knocked a Federal off his horse with a sponge staff 
and captured him . 28 The First New Jersey ' s escape was the last 
action on Fleetwood Heights . 
As the fighting raged around Fleetwood Heights , the extreme 
right of the Confederate position was being engaged by Duffie , 
advancing up the road to Stevensburg . Robertson saw and reported 
the advances of both Gregg and Duffie, and was told by Stuart to 
hold his position; technical l y, he followed orders , but he failed 
to engage either Federa l column , and so only two regiments (the 
Fourth Virginia and the Second South Carolina) opposed Duffie ' s 
four . Perhaps it would be more accurate to say it was one to four, 
because the Fourth Virg i nia twice broke and ran without firing a 
shot ; Heros von Borcke , the boisterous Prussian who had attached 
himself to Stuart ' s staff , had to use the flat of his saber on men 
to maintain even a sembl ance of order . Somehow the h/o regiments 
man aged to hold Duffie up unti l he r ejoined Gregg (who by tha t 
time had been forced off Fleetwood Heights) . 29 The main resul ts 
of this fight \-Jere the deaths of Colonel Frank Hampton , I'lade ' s 
brother , and Captain Wi ll Farley , Stuart ' s chief scout . Far l ey had 
been mounted next to Co l o n e l Cal braith Butler , the commander of 
the Second South Caro l ina , when a richochetting cannonbal l cut off 
But l er ' s foot , passed through and kill ed both their horses , and 
severed Farley ' s right l eg at the knee . Far l ey , being carried from 
the f i e l d , asked for h i s l eg ; it was brought to him and he hugged 
it , t hen laid it gently on the ground , saying with a smi l e , " I t' s 
an old friend , gentleman , and I do not wish to part with it ." He 
said goodbye to everyone near , then died . 30 
Gregg rejoined Buford in front of St . James Church as Stuart ' s 
troopers formed up for another attack ; Buford , who had been advanc-
ing against the weak fo r ce l eft before him when the Con federates 
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went to meet the threat at Fleetwood Heights, was not stopped 
as the enemy returned. 31 Pleasonton now decided to withdraw, Gregg 
recrossing the river at Rappahannock Station and Buford at Beverly 
Ford. 32 
Casualties were around 900 for the Federals, 500 for the Con-
federates. 33 The Federals took three colors and 279 prisoners; 
the Confederates captured three pieces of artillery and about 400 
prisoners. 34 
One of Pleasonton's stated reasons for withdrawing was his 
supposed knowledge that massive Confederate infantry support was 
coming up; Gregg even contended he had been forced to break off the 
attack on Fleetwood Heights because he had been attacked by Confed-
erate infantrymen jumping from a train. 35 But Stuart's report and 
the reports of the commanders of the infantry and its artillery 
are clear; no Confederate infantry was engaged. 36 Perhaps the 
Federals did learn that Confederate infantry was near, but this is 
by no means certain. 37 
Gregg did, as he claimed, take physical possession of the place 
Stuart's H.Q. had been located the day before. 38 But he and 
Pleasonton also claimed to have captured Stuart's papers; in the 
final version of the story, these papers supposedly disclosed all 
of Robert E. Lee's plans for the upcoming Gettysburg campaign, and 
many later writers believed the story. The only loss of any docu-
ments the Confederates acknowledged were Major Beckham's official 
files, in a desk which bounced out of a wagon close to the start 
of the action. 39 Recently, two of the documents the Federals cap-
tured were discovered; one was an order of march for Jones' brigade 
in the June eighth review, the other a letter from a Confederate 
trooper (identified only as "Bill") to his father, relating camp 
gossip that Stuart was about to make a raid. 40 The only logical 
conclusion is that Pleasonton's claims of having captured vitally-
important documents were as much flights of fancy as Gregg's claim 
that he had been attacked by a trainload of Confederate infantry. 
Pleasonton claimed to have stopped the raid Stuart planned 
for the tenth, but Stuart had never planned a raid for Pleasonton 
to have stopped. Also, he claimed to have crippled Stuart so badly 
that he could not adequately screen Lee's advance North, forcing 
Lee to go through the Shenandoah Valley rather east of the Blue 
Ridge Mountains. 41 Actually, Lee had planned all along to go down 
the Valley, and if Stuart had been "crippled" he did not show it in 
the hard month of fighting to come around Aldie, Upperville, etc. 
The other Federal claim (that Pleasonton had intended to make a 
reconnaisance in force) has already been handled,42 but even had 
this been his mission, he failed; he may have seen some Confederate 
infantry but he did not even identify the unit, let alone uncover 
Lee's plans for the upcoming campaign. 43 
Other than the initial disposition of forces and the disgrace-
ful behavior of the Fourth Virginia, the main faults on the Con-
federate side lie with Munford and Robertson. Both failed to follow 
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the great maxim of tactics, move to the sound of the guns, but at 
least ~lunford carried on a little desultory snir.>ing; Robertson 
simply watched two Federal columns march by his positions,44 and 
this is certainly not what Stuart meant when he told Robertson to 
hold his position - it smacks of, if not cowardice , at least 
extreme timidity . Robertson had no place in uniform, let alone on 
the field of battle. 
The South was used to glittering victories from Stuart and, 
from the Southern viewpoint , " . . . Brandy Station can hardly be 
called a victory . ,, 45 The newspapers attacked him viciously, the 
Richmond Examiner leading the way , the Dispatch , Sentinel, 'Nhig, 
and Richmond Enquirer following . ~6 Stuart and his men of course 
resented this , but the fact is that Stuart had been surorised, 
though neither he nor his officers would admit it. 47 Confederate 
General Dorsey Pender made the most balanced comment on the battle : 
"I suppose it is all right that Stuart should get all the blame , 
for when anything handsome is done he gets all the credit. A bad 
rule either way ." 48 
\-Iho won the battle? Clearly, it was the Confederates. Their 
l osses were approximately half the Fedrals', they captured three 
guns , denied Pleasonton the knowledge of Lee ' s p lans and screened 
the Army of Northern Virginia from the enemy, and retained 
possession of the field . But for the first time the Federals had 
attacked Stuart, fought well throughout, and retired in good order. 
By all accounts , Stuart was greatly disturbed by the outcome of 
the battle;49 D. S . Freeman believes he " ... almost certainly .... " 
made his disastrous ride around Meade in Pennsylvania to repolish 
his tarnished image. 50 It is impossible to say so for sure but, 
given Stuart ' s flamboyant personality , it is very likely . 
The superior resources of the North were making themselves 
felt, especially in the area of remounts; as the war dragged on, 
what few horses the Confederate troopers could find grew weaker and 
weaker . And hard-fighting Union cavalrymen like Sheridan, Custer, 
and Kilpatrick were corning to the fore . But it was Brandy Station 
that, in the words of Freeman , " ... made the Federal cavalry .,, 5l 
All accounts agree that the battle sent the morale of the Federal 
troopers soaring. 52 It is hard to see why , since they lost three 
guns and almost twice as many men as the Confederates , but morale 
is an intangible . The Confederate troopers would never again have 
everything their own way , because their opponents had corne of age . 
Brandy Station was the turning point in the cavalry war . 
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by fire from Federal infantry and artillery on the other side of 
the river. Note that Gregg and Newhall , Union officers, take a 
position diametrically opposed to that of von Borcke, a Confederate 
officer. Given the frequent lack of veracity exhibited by both 
sides, there seems to be no way to reconcile this conflict of 
sources. 
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CRITICAL ESSAY ON SOURCES 
The most important primary source for this paper was The \var 
of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies (128 vols., Washington, 1880-1901), 
Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, Pts. I-III. Parts I and II, containing the 
reports of various commanders, were absolutely essential; Part III, 
a gathering of miscellaney, was less important. This work is 
quite nearly frightening; the so-called index is extremely diffi-
cult to use, there seems to be no logic to the arrangement of in-
formation, but it is indispensible because it contains timely, 
first-hand accounts. The next best primary source is The Annals 
of the War Written by Leading Participants North and South 
(Philadelphia, 1879); a composite work written a few years after 
the war, the quality varies with the quality of the individual 
articles. The best article is H. B. McClellan, "The Battle of 
Fleetwood," 392-403; written by Stuart's adjudant, it is marred 
by its pro-Stuart bias, which leads to fantastic conclusions. 
F. C. Newhall, "The Battle of Beverly Ford," 134-146, written by 
one of Pleasonton's aides-de-camp, slights Gregg's part in the 
battle since the author was with Buford, and is marred by its pro-
Northern bias. The author's vainglory and pro- Northern bias gets 
full rein in David McM. Gregg, "The Union Cavalry at Gettysburg," 
372-379. By far the worst is Alfred Pleasonton, "The Campaign of 
Gettysburg," 447-459, which makes ridiculous claims as to the 
effects of the battle and resorts to falsification of evidence to 
"prove" its points. Susan L. Blackford, Letters from Lee's Army: 
or Memoirs of Life in and Out of the Army in Virginia During the 
War Between the States (New York, 1962) is extremely interesting 
but of little help; it is chiefly useful for illuminating Southern-
er's attitudes during the war. 
Of the several secondary sources used, the best is Douglas S. 
Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command (3 vols ., New 
York, 1944), III . It contains extensive footnoting and biblio-
graphy, and the conclusions are judicious. Next in usefulness 
is Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in 
Command (New York , 1968); extensively footnoted (though gathered 
in the back and so hard to use) and containing a long series of 
conclusions drawn from the battle that faults the Federals almost 
entirely, it still manages to leap to the conclusion that the battle 
was a Northern victory. Jennings C. \Vise, The Long Arm of Lee: 
The History of the Artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia 
(New York, 1959; first published 1915), though unfootnoted, is a 
ver y competent work; while focusing on just one combat arm, it 
gives a detailed account of the battle and the pro-South bias is 
remarkably moderate. Abner Doubleday, "Chancellorsville and 
Gettysburg," Campaigns of the Civil War (8 vols., New York, 1963; 
first published 1882) is useful chiefly for its edifying asides 
and representations of the Northern view of the war by a former 
Federal general, and the pro-Northern bias which intrudes is nowhere 
nearly as bad as that in Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds A 
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General: A Military Study of the Civil War (4 vols. , New York , 
1 949) , II. The Northern slant , along with numerous factua l 
mistakes , dictate that this work be used only when it can be 
verified. Louis Phillippe Albert d ' Orleans, Comte de Paris , 
History of the Civil War in America (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1875-
1888) , III , is an interesting work written from the point of view 
of a foreign observer, but too prone to believe all the assertions 
of Northern officers, and contains some factual mistakes . Of 
little use was John B. Mitchell, Decisive Battles of the Civil 
War (New York , 1955) . 
Of the two biographies of Stuart used , the better is John 
W. Thomason , Jr. , Jeb Stuart (New York, 1930); a popu l ar biography 
without footnotes or bib l iography, it is marred by its pro-Stuart 
bias and sensationalism . Surprisingly (since many other second-
ary sources cite it quite often) a very poor work is Burke Davis , 
Jeb Stuart: The Last Cavalier (New York , 1957) ; the footnotes are 
extreme l y weak , it is marred by its sensationalism and pro- Stuart 
bias, contains factual mistakes , and the account of the battle is 
ra t.her cursory . 
'fwo works of memoirs were used: Heros von Borcke, Memoirs 
of the Confederate War for Independence (2 vols ., New York , 1 938; 
first published 1866) , II ; and John S . Mosby , The Memoirs of 
Co l onel John S . Mosby (Ne\~ York, 1969). Both men were very devoted 
to Stuart and the South but , whereas Mosby seems dedicated to 
g l orifying Stuart , von Borcke seems dedicated to glorifying von 
Borcke. Von Borcke contains some factual mistakes , Mosby some 
dubious conclusions ; high l y readable and entertaining , both must 
be used wi t h caution . 
Wi l bur S. Nye , "Brandy Station, June 9: Stuart v . Pleasonton , " 
Civil War Times Illustrated , II (July 1963) is a good, unfootnoted 
introductory study of the battle , though perhaps too hard on the 
Fede r al mistakes and too easy on the Confederate . Other articles 
were : Roy P . Stonesifer , Jr. , "The Union Cavalry Comes of Age ," 
Civil War History , Vol. XI , No . III, 1965 : " ' Grumble' Jones: A 
Personality Profi l e ," Civil War Times Illustrated , VII (June 1968); 
Edward G. Longacre, "Sir Percy Wyndham ," Civil Ivar Times Illustrated, 
VII (Dec . 1968) ; and Russe ll F. Weigley , "David McMurtries Gregg -
A Profi l e ," Civil War Times Illustrated , I (Nov. 1962) . 
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JOHN WALTER CHRISTIE 
AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, 1916-1945 
The 1920's and 1930's were the formative years of u.S. armor 
doctrine and tank design. John Walter Christie was the one man 
who dominated U.S. tank design during those years. Christie was 
a "rugged individualist" whose impetuous qualities were "scarcely 
conducive to harmonious relations with the Army officials with 
whom he dealt. ,,1 Probably ahead of his time, he contributed more 
than any other non-Russian to the state of Soviet armor design dur-
ing the early years of Soviet armor development. 2 
Unfortunately, Christie came to grips with the U.S. military's 
new tecnhical-corporate approach to managing the designin~ of 
armored fighting vehicles (AFV's) and their construction. 
Little is known of Christie's early life. He was born in River 
Edge, New Jersey, on 6 May 1864. In 1881 he went to work at the 
Delameter Iron Works in New York City. vlhile working at Delameter, 
he attended night classes at Cooper Union. Later, Christie worked 
as a consultant engineer for a steamship line. At the turn of the 
century he entered the automotive field. Christie built his own 
cars and tested them in races at Daytona and Indianapolis. In 1904 
he promoted a front wheel drive for cars. In 1912 he began to 
manufacture wheeled tractors to be used to pull fire fighting equip-
ment. In 1916 he developed a front wheel drive truck which was 
used in the Army's Punitive Expedition into Mexico. 4 
The first official recognition of Christie by the U.S. Army 
was on 22 December 1916 when Christie's firm, the Front Wheel Drive 
Motor Company, was awarded a contract to produce a pilot model anti-
aircraft gun motor carriage. This vehicle, despite being over-
weight and having an inadequate gun mount, was enough to ensure 
Christie's consideration in future contracts. 5 
Events were soon to bring Christie and the Army back together. 
In April 1919, the General Headquarters of the American Expedition-
ary Forces appointed a board to consider the lessons of World l-lar I 
as they might affect the organization and tactics of the combat arms. 
The report of the board stated that the tank was an infantry support 
vehicle and that a high speed medium tank should be developed. 
This report set the stage for determining the role of armored forces 
in relation with the other combat arms. The report, in considering 
a high speed vehicle, made the work of John Christie of obvious im-
portance to the U.S . military. 
Edward G. Miller 
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On 30 June 191 9 , a work order making reference to Christie 
was placed by the Artillery Division Manufacturing Service to 
develop a convertible tank capable of movement on both wheels and 
tracks . This idea was not new in military circles . For example 
in 1918 then Colone l George S . Patton Jr . noted that " ' The perfect 
tank would travel on its own wheels, . . and mount itself on 
catipillars /iic7 on entering battle . '" Also the U.S . Tank Corps 
was a nxious to try the convertible concept. Con cerned U. S. offi-
cials wanted an American alternative to British and French 
rhomboidal designs . General Samuel Rockenbach , wartime head of 
the U. S . Tank Corps , wanted Christie to "' go ahead with a l l the 
energy possible . ,,' 6 
Christie produced the M1919 as a result . In early 1919 Patton 
heard of Christie ' s ",ork . Patton went to the Elizabeth , New Jersey , 
headquarters of the Front Wheel Drive Motor Company and found 
Christie a " tall , erect, and scholarly looking man of profound 
technical competence and abundant enthusiasm and his tank the best 
lAF'!] he LPatto~7 had yet encountered . " 
Patton arranged for a demonstration of the vehicle before a 
board of officers from the Ordinance Department . The tank was 
driven under its own power to the test which was located at Fort 
t·leade , Mary l and : 250 mi l es at 30 m. p . h .-quite a feat for the day. 
Patton asked the officers if they would l ike a chan ce to drive 
the vehic l e for themse l ves. When none responded , Patton let his 
wife drive the tank . She ruined her summer dress, but hand l ed the 
tank quite well . After that demonstration , Pa t ton again offered 
to l et his visitor s drive the tank . However , the visitors said 
that they had seen enough . Christie was turned down because in the 
opinion of the Ordinance officers the vehic l e was too difficult to 
maneuver. 7 The fiasco at Fort Meade, while i n teresting , did not 
help Christie ' s efforts . He could little afford to embarrass any-
one- much less the peopl e who wou l d determine if his vehicle could 
be used by the Ar my . 
Patton and a g r oup of officers prepared a report dated 
30 October 1919 regarding t he tests of the Christie Vehic l e : 
The powerplant is unique in three particul ars: 
First : It is set across the length of the machine , thus 
saving space 
Second : The powerplant is completel y equipped with 
large ball bearings at points of friction. 
Third : The motor and transmission are mounted on a sub-
frame , . and are not bolted to the armor . 
Further , this machine gives four forward speeds and 
four reverse . 
Suspension: six of the eight wheels ... have inde-
pendent spring action on the spiral springs . 
Recommendation: The board is of the opinion that much 
wil·l be accomplished if Mr. Christie is empowered to 
design and construct a tank combining the mechanical 
features of the tank with the tactical ideas of the 
Tank Corps.8 
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This report impressed officers with the Ordinance Department. 
The design appeared adequate on paper, but limited tests were in-
sufficient to prove the capabilities of the vehicle. It now 
remained to be seen how the vehicle could be altered to fit speci-
fications of the Ordinance Department. Patton felt that even if 
the vehicle did not meet all specifications, it was worth considera-
tion and should be pursued because it was far advanced for its 
time. 
Despite differing opinions regarding the M19l9, a contract 
between Christie and the Ordinance Department was signed on 
15 June 1920. Christie was ready to develop what might become a 
prototype for a new series of American tanks. 9 
However, Christie found himself forced to work within numerous 
guidelines. In 1919, the Chief of Ordinance had suggested a 
permanent tank development policy. The General Staff decided to 
abolish the Tank Corps. On 5 June 1920 the National defense Act 
placed the tanks under control of the Infantry as a separate and 
competing combat arm. The Infantry would establish requirements 
for tanks and report to the General Staff which would then author-
ize procurement as necessary.lO 
The Adjutant General's Office established the guidelines 
for tank development. The guidelines were established in line with 
current Army policy. Weight limitations were set on light and 
medium tanks (5 and 15 tons respectively), on numbers of different 
types, and stated that the mission of the tank was to "'facilitate 
... advance of the rifleman ..•. ,,,11 Christie had to work 
within these guidelines if he was to sell his vehicles. 
In 1922, Christie resorted to political action to influence 
the War Department. Senator James Frelinghuysen of New York was 
enlisted by Christie to influence the funding of his vehicle designs. 
Senator Frelinghuysen was advised by the Ordinance Department that 
limited funds for development prevented further extension of 
Christie's work. 
Also in 1922, Christie developed an amphibious 76mm self-
propelled gun motor carriage which was tested in New York City in 
February 1923. The hull of the vehicle was made of plate steel with 
the sides packed with cork to increase buoyancy. Two rear mounted 
propellors provided power while in the water. The vehicle could 
attain a speed of 25 m.p.h. on a level road. When tested in New York, 
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the vehicle climed a 40 degree slope at the foot of the Pallisades 
of the Hudson and crossed a two mile wide stretch of the Hudson 
River against a strong tide in 45 minutes. 
A Christie amphibian was used by the Marine Corps in its 1924 
maneuvers on Culebra Island off Puerto Rico. The vehicle was 
loaded onto the deck of a submarine, and after the submarine sub-
merged, the amphibian floated to the surface and swam to shore . 
Some Marine officers saw the tactical possibilities of the amphi-
bian-particularly in river crossing operations. Unfortunately , 
tight money and resistance to change by some senior ~larine officers 
quieted the enthusiasm of some more progressive officers . As a 
resul t, the U. S. entered l~orld \',ar II without an amphibious tank . 
Such a vehicle would have proved valuable in the amphibian opera-
tions conducted during the war . 12 
Then carne the bombshell . On 1 July 1924 the Christie program 
was discontinued by the Army because of the costs involved . The 
program had cost the Ordinance Department $82 , 000 not including the 
test expenses and $100,000 paid to Christie for his patents. The 
Ordinance Department claimed that the total cost of the Christie 
program to date was almost one million dollars. 
The so-called }lodel 1940 was introduced by Christie in 1928. 
Between 1924 and 1928 Christie had not ended his work in designing 
AFV ' s , and the M1940 was a product of five years of development 
I.ork . The H1940 I.as supposed to have been ten years ahead of its 
time, hence the designation M1940. According to Christie the 
M1928/M1940 cost $382,000. It was in this vehicle that Christie 
first employed his helicoil spring suspension system. Christie 
called it the "coil spring knee action suspension . " Each wheel 
I~as independently mounted on a pivot arm which was linked separately 
to a long adjustable coil spring positioned vertically between an 
inner and outer hull plate. 13 
An October 1928 demonstration of the 111928 impressed Army 
Chief of Staff General Charles P. Summerall. He ordered that the 
vehicle be tested by the Infantry Tank Board at Christie's expense . 
However, the tests did not prove satisfactory and the vehicle was 
returned to the Christie factory several times for repairs and 
modifications. 
On 19 February 1929, Secretary of War Dwiqht P . Davis directed 
the Ordinance Department to purchase the M1928 for testing . In 
June 1929 , the tests were stopped and the vehicle was handed to the 
Cavalry for further testing. Patton was a member of the test board, 
and along with other Cavalry officers felt the M1928 chassis could 
be used as the basis for an armored car . 
At that time , the Cavalry was considering the incorporation 
of a tank platoon for duty with the First Cavalry Division . Some 
Cavalrymen felt that the high speed Christie vehicle was suited to 
developing doctrine which stressed speed , shock , mobility and 
45 
firepower. Farsighted officers wished to utilize a mechanized 
force to execute missions based on a wide-ranging area of opera-
tion. The exponents of this doctrine in the u.s. were Adna 
Chaffee"and Daniel VanVoorhis. In Europe men such as B. H. 
Lidell-Hart, G. LeQ. Martel, Heinz Guderian and Charles DeGaulle 
were proponents of the new "lightning warfare." 
When the Ordinance Department requested a price quote from 
Christie, he offered to sell the design to Ordinance for $82,750 
with the condition that the development cost be spread over 
eight vehicles and with an additional $35,000 per vehicle as the 
manufacturing cost . The Ordinance Department felt the cost too 
high and Christie refused to lower the cost. 
During the period of negotiations with Christie, the Infantry 
planned to purchase a number of Christie vehicles. The appropria-
tion for development of the T1E2 light tank ($250,000) was to be 
used to purchase four or five Christie tanks for extended tests. 
However, ~1ajor General Robert Allen, Chief of Infantry between 
1925 and 1929, criticized the Ordinance Department for spending 
too much time on the Christie program . He endorsed adoption of the 
T1E2. The order to purchase the chassis was revoked on 6 January 
1930. 
Christie placed the only bid for contracts to be let for 
light tank procurement in fiscal 1931. The new Chief of Ordinance , 
Major General Samuel Hof, opposed the purchase of the Christie 
tanks because he thought Ordinance policy should be the procure-
ment of a single model for tests. Then , if the vehicle was satis-
factory, additional models could be purchased. 
In June 1930, Christie informed the Ordinance Department that 
the price of one M1928 with production rights was $135,000. The 
price was unacceptable to officials. On 18 June Christie informed 
the Ordinance Department that he was prepared to bring political 
pressure to bear if nothing came of the negotiations. 
Chief of Staff Summerall called a conference on 26 June to 
"iron out" the troubles. Summerall ordered a contract with Christie 
be prepared . The contract, which was signed on 28 June, called 
for the production of one M1928 at $55,000 plus $6,000 for testing . 
On 1 July, $188,000 of the $250,000 appropriation for a light tank 
then being developed by the Ordinance Department was recalled 
because it had not been obligated due to the controversy with 
Christie. 14 
Although Christie had agreed to deliver the tank on 1 September, 
it was delayed until 19 January 1931 partly because Christie had 
previously signed a contract for purchase by the Soviet Union of 
two Christie chassis. The members of a Soviet commission touring 
the U.S. to inspect AFV designs were impressed with the Christie 
convertible design : "'It is indeed unfortunate that he /Christie7 
was born in the imperialist camp and hence not given the-chance to 
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exploit his ideas to the full . ". Christie refused a direct offer 
of money by the soviets . Until the demonstration of the M1928 , 
the soviet Union had copied AFV designs from Germany and Britain. 
The Soviets sought a simple, reliable tank, and apparently found 
what they were looking for in the M192 8 . l5 
Although the Ordinance Department was displeased by Christie ' s 
dealings with the Soviets, two chassis were imported by the Soviet 
Union in 1931. Manufacture of a Soviet copy of the M1928 began in 
May 1 931 , resulting in the BT series which remained in production 
until it was replaced by the T34 in 1940. Through the Christie 
chassis, the Soviet union was able to translate its own blitzkrieg 
theories into reality.16 
Five Christie chassis were ordered by Poland in 1931. The 
Polish government was alarmed because it could not understand the 
U.S. government permitting such a sale to an unrecognized government 
considered hostile by Poland. Although Poland defaulted on the 
order, when the 10TP appeared a few years later, it bore a strik-
ing resemblance to the M1931. l7 
The next Chief of Infantry, Major General Stephen o. Fuqua, 
strongly endorsed the Christie program . He soon came into conflict 
with the Ordinance Department . The Infantry saw the Christie tank 
as possessing the asset of strategic mobility because of its con-
vertibili t y . The Infantry realized that for fast breakthrough and 
flanking movements speed was essential. 
Ordinance , however , was concerned with the mechanical aspects 
of the design. As most tests had been conducted without armor or 
weapons, the Ordinance Department was quite naturally concerned 
about the mechanical reliability of the chassis. Also , Ordinance 
felt that all tests could be carried out with only one tank . 
By late 1930 the controversy had reached the Senate War 
Department Sub-Committee. At that time, Ordinance had carried out 
tests which the tank could not pass . On 6 Ma rch 1931, Hof offered 
Christie $54 , 000 for the tank and a complete set of dra\·lings. 
Christie refused to sell unless he could be assured that the con-
tractor would be given an order for additional tanks . 
Then General Douglas MacArthur , Army Chief of Staff , entered 
the controversy . In 1931, after assuming duties as Chief of Staff , 
MacArthur ordered that "'Every part of the Army will mechanize as 
far as practicable and possib l e. '" He was advised by the Senate 
committee that the entire appropriation for tanks in fiscal 1932 
($250,000) was to be applied to Christie programs . MacArthur 
advised the committee that the Christie tank had not passed all tests 
and that it would be dangerous to apply all funds to testing such 
vehic les. Meanwhi le, Christie demanded that the tank be returned 
to his factory to correct mechanical p roblems. Once accomplished, 
Christie planned to deliver the tank at the $54,000 figure. The 
Ordinance Department felt that the Christie tank did "demonstrate 
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possibilities" but its limitations had not been determined . The 
Infantry continued to request purchase, however, and Christie vIas 
awarded a contract for development of what would be known as the 
M1931. l8 
A fully equipped ~1l93l (Army designation T3) weighed 10.5 tons. 
A total of nine were built: numbers 1, 3, 4, 5 were delivered to 
the Cavalry at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Numbers 2, 6, 7 were delivered 
to the Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia. The T3's delivered to 
Fort Knox were designated Tl Combat Cars because the Cavalry was 
forbidden to have tanks. The Cavalry Tl's were armed with a single 
.50 cal. machine gun, the Infantry T3's were armed with a 37mm 
cannon. The M193l utilized the helicoil spring suspension system. 19 
A Tl platoon leader stationed at Fort Knox at this time noted 
that the tanks \'lere highly regarded by their crews in spite of 
mechanical troubles which involved mainly the transmission and 
clutches. 
In the Tl the gunner stood on the floor of the fighting com-
partment with his feet spread. The commander straddled the gunner 
and stood on boxes of tools of ammunition crates. The driver was 
directed by the foot signals of the commander. 
The platoon leader also related the following song which was 
composed in the General Mess at Fort Knox and sung to the tune of 
the Caisson Song: 
First on wheels then on tracks 
As we break our bloody backs, 
Keep those Christie's a'rolling along. 
In and out, mostly out, 
While you hear the Colonel shout, 
Keep those Christie's a'rolling along. 
For its Hi-Hi-Hee 
In the Horse-Tank Cavalree. 
Have on your clutches hard and strong 
Where ere you go 
You will always know 
That those Christies are rolling along 
Lord keep them rolling, 
Keep those Christie's a'rolling along. 20 
By 1932, working arrangements between Christie and the Ordinance 
Department were impossible. The quarrel now centered around speci-
fications of a new "flying tank" at the same time Ordinance was try-
ing to improve only existing convertible designs in line with 
Infantry and Cavalry recommendations. To add to the confusion, 
the Chief of Staff recommended in 1931 that the Infantry and 
Cavalry develop their own tank designs. 
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On 18 May 1932 , Fuqua requested standardization of the T3/Tl. 
Afterwards, the Infantry pointed out that the main trouble with the 
T3 lay in the Ordinance-supplied engines. So, by mid-1932, only 
seven years from the start of World War II , the Army did not 
possess a satisfactory tank. 
Also in 1932, Christie introduced the design for an airborne 
tank. The new M1932 accommodated wings and a propellor. Airfoil 
surfaces were to be attached to the hull of the tank with the 
tracks to be used as a powered undercarriage. At the moment of 
takeoff , power was to be transferred to a rear mounted propellor . 
Later, Christie designed a system whereby an airplane would land 
the tank, detach it, and fly off to pick up another . 21 Christie 
managed to have this tank discussed in the U.S . House during the 
May 1932 meeting on military appropriations . 
In June 1932 , the Ordinance Department recommended a new plan 
that would correct defects in the Christie design . Then , Christie 
\~arned all competitors that he alone had the right to manufacture 
new convertible designs . Though Christie threatened legal action , 
it was determined that under the 1920 agreement , the Army could 
use all Christie patents. 
In late 1932 Christie lectured at the Infantry School at 
Fort Benning . He visited Fort Knox to discuss designs with 
VanVoorhis . Throughout the period Christie maintained that "he 
was the only man who knew how to build tanks . . and that if he 
did not get the contract for tanks in FY 1933 he would make trouble 
for the company that did ." 
Speaking before a House committee in 1933, MacArthur credited 
the Christie tanks with 0 ' . awaking the Cavalry to the possi-
bility of supplanting the horse in some of its units with fighting 
machines. ' I' 
It was determined by the Department of Experiment of the 
Infantry School in late 1932 that the T3 ' s tested were superior 
to any tank design developed by any concern to date. The Depart-
ment of Experiment recommended that the T3 be adopted as standard 
and that all appropriations for fiscal 1933 be devoted to the T3 . 
However, it was noted that the T3 needed improvement in crew room 
and firepower. 
When the Infantry invited bids in late 1932 for development 
of a convertible tank, Christie refused to bid on the grounds that 
the specifications were outdated and contained some requirements 
that he refused to consider. The contract was awarded to other 
firms . Then Christie asked the Secretary of War to reject all bids 
and arrange for a meetinq of officers from the Ordinance Department, 
Fort Knox, Fort Benning, and his own company in order to forumlate 
new plans that met his standards. This request was rejected because 
the War Department felt that all requirements of the Infantry had 
been met. 
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Due to financial problems caused in part by the depression, 
Christie made one las t attempt to sell the tank tested in early 
19 31 . He offered to sell the design to the War Department for 
$20,000, but in a letter to the Secretary of War, he remained crit-
ical of the Ordinance Department. He was informed that funds were 
not available. Christie then had the tank parked and immobilized 
in the courtyard of the State, War and Navy Building where it 
remained until towed to the Ordinance Disposal yard . 
Soon afterwards, a directive was issued by the Secretary of 
War stipulating a weight limit of 7.5 tons for tanks and a lower 
cost than current models under consideration. This directive was 
responsibile for the eventual phasing out of the expensive con-
vertible models. 22 
In 1936 Christie went to England and met the same problems 
that faced him in the U.S. He could not work within the British 
system. Christie managed to acquire the tank which had been towed 
from the State, War and Navy Building and had it shipped to England. 
It served as the basis for a series of British cruiser tanks. For 
the first time in Britain, thoughts of designing a tank with ease 
of mass production in mind were considered. 
With the funds acquired from the sale of the tank to the 
British in 19 36 , Christie began to develop the M1937. He was told 
by the Ordinance Department that the design did not meet service 
requirements. Christie responded by threatening to see President 
Roosevel t and War Department officials in order to get permission 
to undertake production of large numbers of his tanks. If this 
action did not succeed, Christie was prepared to organize civilian 
manufacturers in order to produce enough tanks so that one could 
be furnished to each college in the U.S. to train future tankers. 23 
This was the irrational response of a tired man to a system which 
he could not tolerate. 
In February 1941, representatives from the Ordinance Department 
conferred with representatives of the Army Air Forces General Staff 
and the Armored Force to consider the development of a special 
light tank for use in airborne operations. The lightweight tanks 
of the Christie design were studied. Christie was consulted, but 
he stated that he was only an idea man and that the development 
of ideas was the responsibility of others. 24 
On 2 December 1941, a memorandum from G3 to G4 of the General 
Staff recommended that a 37 mm gun motor carriage be developed for 
the Tank Destroyer Force using the Christie helicoil suspension 
system. Eventually this vehicle was developed into the M18 "Hellcat" 
tank destroyer which saw considerable action in World ~~ar 11. 25 
John Walter Christie died of chronic myocarditis at age 78 in 
Falls Church, Virginia , on 11 January 1944. He was survived by his 
wife, Elizabeth, and an adopted son, Edward. At the time of his 
death, Christie and his son were working on a design which was called 
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the M1950. The M1950 bore a striking resemblance to the Sweedish 
Stridvagn "5 " Type of 1963. In 1945 his estate filed a brief with 
the Chairman of the House Committee on claims requesting $250,000 
as compensation for the development costs of Christie ' s designs. 
The claim was never settled . 26 
Development of a satisfactory medium tank was hampered for 
years because of the amount of time and money invested in the 
Christie program . Christie's tanks met the criterion for conduct 
of high speed mechanized warfare, but mechanical problems prevented 
their standardization . Most of the vehicles were tested without 
armor, turret or \.,eapons . These tests offered little view of what 
the designs could withstand in the field . Most of the designs 
lacked features essential in an AFV . Unmodified, the Christie 
suspension was too weak. The fighting compartments of the tanks 
were too small, the engines were of a difficult to produce, liquid 
cooled type and the tracks had a short life . The convertability 
design was opposed to good engineering practice which did not seek 
to design "two- purpose" equipment . Some engineers, however , saw 
convertibility as an attractive feature . 27 
Christie believed mobility and speed were more important than 
firepower or armor protection : 
My first object was to build a chassis that will protect 
the man who is facing the enemy . Therefore, we built 
a chassis with frontal lines and slopes that will make 
it almost impossible to penetrate the chassis with any 
type of projectile. Next, we constructed the chassis as 
low as possible. . we then turned to speed. L193~728 
Christie "labored for years" to build a vehicle that would fit his 
philosophy. He reasoned that in mobile warfare the key to success 
is mobility. Unfortunately, his ideas developed so fast that 
nothing could be proved. 29 
Christie "did not fit into the corporateness of the Ordinance 
Department." When he resorted to flashy public demonstrations, 
political dealings, and the news media he fell into disfavor with 
the Ordinance Department. 
If the military charisterics of a new vehicle met the approval 
of the General Staff, the ideas were then discussed by the Ordinance 
Committee which was made up of members from the using arms. 
Specifications would then be drawn up, and if the specifications 
met all around approval, a design would then be prepared by the 
Ordinance Department and the using arms. Then the ideas would 
either be accepted or dropped. Through the Ordinance Committee, 
the Technical Staff maintained contact with the using arms on 
questions affecting the military characteristics of a new design. 
Thus the Technical Staff had the responsibility to supervise and 
coordinate design and development of AFV's and advise the Chief of 
Ordinance on the adoption of a design as standard military item. 30 
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Ma j o r Lev i n Campbe ll of t he Ordinance Department , writing in 
1 929 , c a lled fo r the development of a small experimental mechanized 
fo r ce to se r ve as a laboratory for the devel opment o f new equipment . 
He fe l t that peacetime development o f a few experimenta l vehicles 
woul d be to the advantage in reducing the time needed to reach 
q uan t ity production in time of war . Some , however , felt tha t 
"making per fectio n in an experimental vehicle the cr i terio n fo r 
standardization " hampered design progres s -a s in a Christie type 
program . Christie cou l d not operate with in th is system . On occa-
sion , he would submit a design directly t o the using a rm; thus 
bypassing and alienating the Ordinance Department . 
In a time of limited funds for research and development pro-
grams , the Ordinance Department was unable t o afford a wide variety 
of development progr ams. Funds had t o be applied to designs which 
could be commercially p roduced on a large scale. Struggling to 
stretch funds as far as poss ible , the Ordinance Department put its 
money on a light 8 . 5 ton t a nk. But Christie's tank upset the 
Ordinance Department because the Department could visua l ize much 
more spent than pr actib l e or possible on special p rograms such as 
the Christie . 31 
In the end neither the Ordinance Department nor Christie had 
a method of operat ion which was compatible with the other. It is 
indeed unfor t una te that neither side cou l d compromise and produc e 
a satisfactory AFV for the u . S . Whi l e the Infantry and Cavalry 
" adored" the Christie tanks, the spectre o f mechanical unreliability 
haunted the Christie series of AFV ' s for over twenty years , and u . S. 
armored development remained in the hands of the Or dinance Depart-
ment. 
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THE BEATLES' EFFECT ON CULTURE 
They have not performed together on stage for more than 
eleven years. They have not made a record together in eight years . 
The formal dissolution of their partnership in a London courtroom 
in 1975 was an echo of an ending that came long ago. Now each of 
them is trying to overcome the shadow of a past in \~hich they were 
bound together by wealth, fame and adulation of an intensity un-
equaled in our culture. George Harrison scorns talk of a reunion, 
telling us to stop living in the past. John Lennon told us years 
ago that "the dream is over."l 
He was right: When the Beatles broke up in 1 970 amidst l aw-
suits and recriminations, the 60's were ending also---in spirit as 
well as by the calendar. Bloodshed and bombings on campuses , the 
harsh realities behind the hopes for a "Woodstock nation," the 
refuse of counter-culture communities, all helped kill the dream . 
What remains remarkable now, more than a decade after their 
firs t worldwide conquest, is how appealing this dream was; how its 
vision of the world gripped so much of a generation; and also how 
that dream re-shaped our recent past a nd affects us stil l. \~hat 
remains remarkable is how strongly this dream was triggered, nur-
tured and broadened by one rock 'n' roll band of four Englishmen 
whose entire history as a group occured before any of them reached 
the age of thirty . It wi ll be the purpose of this paper to call 
attention to the effect of the Beatles' words and music on certain 
shifts in American culture and to spell out some of the implica-
tions their presence had for subsequent generations (including my 
own). They were originally a product of England, but their influ-
ence was ultimately felt the wor l d over. Their very power 
guarantees that an attempt at analysis cannot be fully successful. 
Their songs, their films, their lives formed so great a part of 
what we listened to and watched and talked about that everyone 
still sees the Beatles and hears their songs through a personal 
prism. And the Beatles themselves never abandoned a sense of self-
parody and put- on. They were, in Richard Goldstein's phrase, "the 
clown-gurus of the sixties."2 Lennon said more than once that the 
Beatles sometimes put elusive references into their songs just to 
confuse their more solemn interpreters. 
Still, the impact of the Beatles cannot be waved away . If 
the Marx they emulated was Groucho, not Karl, if their worl d was 
a p layground instead of a battleground, they still changed what we 
l is tened to and how we listened to it; they helped make rock music 
a battering ram for the youth culture's assault on the mainstream, 
and that assault in turn changed our culture permanently . And if 
D. Scott Furkin 
58 
the "dream" t he Be a tles helped to create could not sustain itself 
in the re a l "lorld , that perhap s s peaks more o f our false hopes 
than t o the ir pr omises. They wrote and sang songs . We turned it 
into politics and philosop hy and a roa d map to another way of life . 
The Bea tles grew up as children of the first generation of 
rock ' n' roll, listening to and imitating the music of Little 
Richard, Larry Williams , Chuck Berry , El v is Presley , and the later, 
more sophisticated sounds of the Shirelles and the Miracles . It 
was the s pecial genius of their first mentor, Brian E;:>stein , to 
package four Liverpool working - class " rockers" as "mods" by re-
placing their greasy hair , leather jackets, and on-stage vulgarity 
with jackets , ties , smiles , and carefully groomed , distinctive 
haircuts. 3 Just as white artists fi ltered and softened the raw 
energy of black artists in the ' 50 ' s , the Beatles were at first 
softer, safer versions of energetic rock ' n ' roll musicians . The 
words said that they only wanted to hold hands; the rhythm was more 
insistent . 
By coming into prominence early in 1964, the Beatles probably 
saved rock ' n ' roll from extinction. Rock in the early ' 60 ' s 
existed in name only ; apart from the soul artists , it was a time 
of "scholock rock , " as one writer has called it. 4 By contrast , 
the Beatles provided a sense of musical energy that made success-
ful a brilliant public-relations effort . Of course , the $50 , 000 
used to promote the Beatles' first American appearance in February , 
1964 helped fue l some of the early hysteria . 5 
So did the timing of their arrival . Coming as it did less 
than a hundred day s after the murder of John Kennedy , the advent 
of the Beatl es caught America ready for any diversion to replace 
its depression . 
The Beatles, however , had more than hype; they had talent . 
Even their first hits , "I Want to Hold Your Hand , " "She Loves You ," 
"Please Please Me ," "I Saw Her Standing There" had a hint of harmo-
nies and melodies more inventive than standard rock tunes. More 
important, it became immediatel y apparent that the Beatles were 
hipper, more complicated than the bovine rock stars who could not 
seem to put four coherent words together . 
In the spring of 1964, John Lennon publi shed a book , "In His 
Own Write ," which offered word play s , puns and black- humor satiri-
ca l sketches. 6 A few months later came the fi l m "A Hard Day 's 
Night " and the Beatles and director Richard Lester created a funny 
movie parodying the Beatles ' own image . 7 
The real surprise came at the end of 1965 with the release of 
the "Rubber Soul " album . Starting with that album and continuing 
through " Revolver" and" Sgt . Pepper ' s Lone l y Heart ' s Club Band ," 
the Beatles began to throwaway the rigid conventions of rock 'n ' 
roll music and l yrics . The banal , abstract, second- hand emotions 
were replaced with sharp, sometimes mordant portraits of first - hand 
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people and e x periences, linked to music tha t was more complica ted 
and more compelling than rock had e ver dared attempt. The Beatles 
were drawing on their memories and feelings, not those cut from 
Tin Pan Al ley cloth. 
"Norwegian (';ood" was about an unhappy , inconclus ive a ffair. 
"Michelle" and "Yesterday " were haunting, sentime ntal ballads, and 
Paul McCartney even sang part of "!1ichelle" i n French---most rock 
singers regarded English as a foreign l anguage. "Penny Lane" used 
cornets to evoke the sugges tion of a faintly heard band concert on 
a long-ago summer day . Staccato string s lent urgency to the story 
of "Eleanor Rigby." 
These songs were different from the rock music that our elders 
had scorned with impunity . Traditionally, rock 'n' roll was rigidly 
structured: 4/4 tempo, 32 bars, with a limited range of instru-
ments. Before the Beatles, rock producer Phil Spector had revolu-
tionized records by adding strings to the drums, bass, sax, and 
guitars, but the chord structure was usually limited to a basic 
blues or ballad pattern. Now the Beatles, with the kind of v isi-
bility that made them impossible to ignore, were expanding the 
range of rock, musically and l yrically. A sintar, a harpsichord 
effect, a ragtime piano---everything was possible. S 
With the release of "Sgt. Pepper" in the spring of 1967, the 
era of rock as a strictly adolescent phenomenon was gone. One 
song, "A Day in the Life," with its recital of an ordinary day 
combined with a dreamlike sense of dread and anxiety , made it i mpos-
sible to ignore the skills of Lennon and McCartney . Once "Sgt. 
Pepper" was recorded, Partisan Review was lauding the Beatles, Ned 
Rorem proclaimed that "She's Leav ing Home" ~las "equal to any song 
Schubert e ver wrote," and a Newsweek critic meant it when he said : 
"'Strawberry Fields Forever' (is) a superb Beatleizing of hope and 
despair in which the four minstrels regretfully recommend a 
Keatsian lotusland of withdrawal from the centrifugal stresses of 
the age.,,9 
"We're so well established," ~lcCartney had said in 1966, "that 
we can bring fans along with us and stretch the limits of pop."lD 
By using their fame to help break through the boundaries of rock, 
the Beatles proved that they were not the puppets of backstage mani-
pulation. Instead, they helped to make rock music the music of an 
entire international generation. Perhaps for the first time in 
history , it was possible to say that tens of millions of people, 
defined simply by age, were all doing the same thing: they were 
listening to rock 'n' roll. That fact chang ed the popular culture 
of the world. 
Looking back on the last half of the last decade, it is hard 
to think of a cultural innovation that did not carry with it the 
influence of rock music, and of the Beatles in particular: the 
miniskirt, discotheques, the graphics of Peter Ma x , the birth of 
publications like Rolling Stone, the "mind-bend ing" ef f ects of TV 
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commercials, the success of "Laugh-In" on television and "Easy 
Rider" in the movies---all these cultural milestones owe something 
to the emergence of rock music as the most compelling and pervasive 
force in our culture . 
This is especially true of the incredible spread of drugs- --
marijuana and the hallucinogens most particula rly---among the 
youth culture. From "Rubber Soul" through "Sgt . Pepper," Beatle 
music was suffused with a sense of my stery and my sticism: odd 
choral progressions , mysterious instruments, dream- like effects, 
and images that did not seem to y ield to "straight" interpretations . 
Whether specific songs ( " Lucy in the Sky tvi th Diamonds," "A Little 
Help From My Friends") were deliberately referring to drugs is 
beside the point . The Beatles were publicly recounting their LSD 
experiences, and their music was replete with antirational sensibil-
ity. Indeed, it was almost a commonplace among contemporaries that 
Beatle albums could not be full y understood without the use of a 
p l ant or a pill. Hunter Thompson said , "When the Beatles told us 
to turn off our minds and float downstream , we assumed that the key 
to this kind of mind-expansion was in drugs . ,,11 Together with "head" 
groups like Jefferson Airplane and The Grateful Dead , the Beatl es 
were, consciously or not , a major influence behind the spread of 
drugs . 
In this sense , the Beatles are part of a chain : 1) the Beatles 
opened up rock ; 2) rock changed the culture; 3) the cul ture changed 
us . Even limited to their impact as musicians , however , the 
Beatles were as powerfu l an influence as any group or individual ; 
only Bob Dylan stands as their equal . 
They tvere always moving; they never stayed with a successfu l 
formula. John Gabree , one of the early rock writers, said that 
"their job , and they have done it we ll, has been to travel a few 
miles behind the avant- garde , consolidating gains and popu l a rizing 
new ideas . "12 By virtue of their fame , then, the Beatles were a 
giant amplifier , spreading "the word " on virtually every trend and 
mood of the last decade . It was almost inevitable that , even agains t 
their will , their listeners shaped a d ream of politics and life-
style from the substance of popular music . It is testament both 
to the power of rock music and to the i llusion s which can be spun 
out of impulses. 
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